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Executive Summary 
 
The main transfer instrument from the central governments to local government units (LGUs) in 
the Philippines, the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment), introduced in 2001, has been criticized 
for two main failings: its inability to equalize sufficiently, especially regarding the poorer 
municipalities and provinces, and that its funds have not been spent in an efficient manner. 
Recently LGU associations have petitioned the Government of the Philippines (GoP) for an 
expansion in the funding of the IRA from 40 percent of internal revenue collections to 50 
percent, and several draft Bills have been prepared.  
 
There appears to be ample consensus that if the additional 10 percent in funding were to take 
place, these funds should not be distributed following the same methodology used for the IRA 
and that a new transfer mechanism should be put in place. Two general requirements for the new 
transfers are often mentioned. First, the distribution of the additional funds would need to have a 
much stronger equalization effect among LGUs. Second, the recipient LGUs would need to be 
held accountable to use the funds to improve the performance of public services.  
 
The new transfer so far has been called the ―Local Government Enhancement Fund‖ or LGEF. 
We propose a more descriptive name for it -- the fund for ―Fiscal Equity and Expenditure 
Performance‖ or FEEP. 
 
The design of the new transfer with 10 percent additional funding and separate from the IRA will 
face four major challenges: (1) How to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10 
percent additional funding (2) How to apportion the additional funding among the different 
groups of LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays) (3) What formula to use for 
the distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group of LGUs (4) 
How to ensure that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery 
performance  These four challenges are addressed in this paper.  
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First challenge: Origin and computation of the 10 percent additional funding 
 
Two main options are explored: Using the same base as for the IRA, which is internal revenue 
collection; or using the broader base of total national revenues, which expands the IRA base to 
include all collections by the Customs Office and Internal Revenue. Obviously, the 10 percent 
equivalent increase in funding would be the same under both options. The potentially important 
difference between these two approaches is how the two bases (internal revenue versus total 
revenue) will perform in the future, in particular from the viewpoint of their volatility. We find 
that, although there is some evidence that the broader base (total revenues) exhibits a bit more 
volatility over time, the differences are not too significant. Therefore, there is not a clear 
preference for either of the two bases for the FEEP.  
 
Several other (less orthodox) options for obtaining the additional funding are also explored. First, 
to freeze the funding of the IRA as of 2011, holding harmless all LGUs in the future years to the 
same funding in absolute numbers that they had in 2011, and utilizing the increases in nominal 
pesos from the 40 percent formula for the IRA to finance and expand the FEEP. This would 
mean that the importance of the FEEP vis-à-vis the IRA would increase over the years and it 
would be an indirect way to reform the IRA. Second, to shift some of the resources currently 
distributed through the National Government conditional transfers to the FEEP, in particular 
special funds in the budgets of sectoral agencies (e.g., Agriculture) that may not be used or that 
are inefficiently utilized. Third, to consider the introduction of negative transfers from better-off 
LGUs to the FEEP fund. A good number of countries around the world finance their equalization 
grants fully or partially with what is known ‗fraternal‘ systems (also known as Robin Hood 
systems) of finance that demand transfers from the richer LGUs to compensate the poorer 
LGUS. 
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Second challenge: The vertical apportionment of the 10 percent additional funds among 
provinces, cities, and municipalities 
 
Perhaps the greatest challenge in designing the FEEP is how to apportion the additional funding 
among the different groups of LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays). In the 
paper we explore several possibilities. One of the options considered is to modify the current 
apportionment percentages used in the IRA by excluding the Barangays from the vertical 
distribution and distributing their share proportionally to what the other subgroups of LGUs 
have. Currently, the IRA is subject to a vertical distribution formula that provides 23 percent of 
the funds to provincial governments, 23 percent of the funds to the cities, 34 percent to the 
municipalities, and 20 percent to the barangays. The proposal would produce shares of 28.75 
percent for provinces and cities, and 42.50 percent for municipalities.  
 
We consider a second option with the vertical distribution among provinces, cities and 
municipalities being proportional to their respective aggregate positive fiscal gaps, where those 
fiscal gaps are estimated in this paper. The advantage of either approach is that they offer a 
rationale for the vertical distribution as opposed to some new rule that is again arbitrarily 
derived. The apportionment percentages under this approach will become approximately 15 
percent for provinces, 18 percent for cities, and 67 percent for municipalities.  
 
Fundamentally this second approach is the only sound approach to the derivation of the vertical 
distribution rule. However in the future ―true expenditure needs‖ of the different subgroups of 
LGUs would have to be derived; in the paper we use a historical approximation to expenditure 
needs and there is no reason to expect the two measures of expenditure needs to actually 
coincide. In the paper we provide and simulate different methodologies to compute the 
expenditure needs of LGUs 
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Third challenge: What formula to use for the distribution of the additional funds 
 
This section develops several approaches for distribution of the new available funds among local 
governments within each subgroup of LGUs. That is, given the funds available separately for 
provinces, cities, and municipalities, obtained in the previous step, the question then becomes 
how to distribute among municipalities themselves, etc. There are two main conceptual 
departures in what is being proposed from what is currently done under the IRA. Under the new 
distribution rules: First, not all local governments would get funds; that is, a good number of 
them would get zero. Second, the distribution of funds would be based on the quantification of 
the ―fiscal gap‖ concept, which is defined as the difference between expenditure needs of a local 
government and its fiscal capacity to raise revenues.  
 
Before discussing and computing the concepts of fiscal gap, expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity, the paper presents a formula to distribute the funds in each subgroup of LGUs that is 
similar but significantly improves upon the current formula used for the IRA (a weighted index 
of population, land area, and equal shares).  The improved weighted index introduces additional 
factors to population and land area to better proxy the differences in expenditure needs. These 
factors include the young and elderly populations and the incidence of poverty. We also 
introduce an additional factor in the weighted index to account for the differences in fiscal 
capacity across LGUs. Note that the new improved index eliminates the equal share factor 
currently used in the IRA. However, under this expanded weighted index approach all LGUs still 
receive some FEEP transfers. That is not the case with the fiscal gap approach that follows. 
 
The core approach to the distribution of funds within each subgroup of LGUs consists of the 
estimation of a fiscal gap, defined as the difference between expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity, for each LGU. The paper reviews the different methodologies available for the 
estimation of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and it implements with data for 2008 two 
measures for the estimation of expenditure needs and also two measures for the estimation of 
fiscal capacity.  
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The simulations of the FEEP transfers are carried out with the different methodologies assuming 
two different vertical allocation rules (across subgroups of LGUs). The first is a modified IRA 
allocation rule (excluding Barangays)—and the results are reproduced in the first table below-- 
and the second is in proportion to the aggregate positive fiscal gaps in each subgroup of LGUs 
(provinces, cities and municipalities) —and the results are reproduced in the second table below. 
Note that using the fiscal gap approach allows restriction of FEEP transfers only to those LGUs 
that have a positive fiscal gap (that is, where expenditure needs exceed fiscal capacity). 
 
Per capita FEEP Transfers under Proportional Allocation and Adjusted IRA Vertical 
Distribution Rule  
(for 2008 in PhP) 
 Provinces Cities Municipalities 
    
Min 0 0 0 
Max 2031.23 4445.48 9068.76 
Average 126.42 576.52 315.71 
Standard deviation 326.42 1016.61 669.30 
Coeff. of variation 2.58 1.76 2.12 
Total FEEP transfers 
(in million PhP) 
15,376.74 15,376.74 22,730.83 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Per capita FEEP Transfers under Proportional Allocation and Share of Aggregate Fiscal 
Gap Vertical Distribution Rule  
(for 2008 in PhP) 
 Provinces Cities Municipalities 
    
Min 0 0 0 
Max 127.17 3,213.12 16,520.08 
Average 7.92 416.70 575.12 
Standard deviation 20.44 734.79 1,219.23 
Coeff. of variation 2.58 1.76 2.12 
Total FEEP transfers 
(in million PhP) 
9,627.18 11,114.03 41,407.54 
Source: Own Calculations.     
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Fourth challenge: Holding LGUs accountable to improve the performance of expenditures 
 
The last section of the paper addresses the issue of how to make sure that the additional FEEP 
funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to using 
ex-ante conditionality for receiving the additional funds, the paper proposes to use ex-post 
performance indicators. This approach preserves a higher degree of autonomy of LGUs.  The 
carefully selected performance indicators would need to be measured independently from the 
LGUs themselves and should be meaningful in mattering in a significant way in the quality of 
life of LGU residents. The indicators should preferably be service outputs, as opposed to 
outcomes, given that the local jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service outcomes. 
Because of very different starting points in most indicators for different LGUs, performance 
would need to be read as differentiated changes in the selected indicators. Failure to deliver 
improved performance in the set period, say after 2 or 3 years, would be followed by suspension 
of half of the available funding. After another round or period of performance, for example three 
more years, the funding could be completely suspended, with continued failure to improve, or 
fully restored, with increased performance. Although the paper explores the past experience in 
the Philippines with performance indicators and the several possibilities there may be available, 
the actual selection of the performance indicators will require further work in the future.  
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I.  Introduction  
 
The main transfer instrument from the central governments to local government units
2
 (LGUs) in 
the Philippines, the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment), introduced in 2001, has been criticized 
for two main failings.
3
 The first is its inability to equalize sufficiently, especially regarding the 
poorer municipalities and provinces, especially vis-à-vis the fiscal standing of many ―rich‖ cities. 
The second is the feeling that the IRA funds, to a large extent unconditional in their use by 
LGUs, have not been spent in an efficient manner to improve the daily life of ordinary citizens 
throughout the national territory.  
 
Recently LGU associations have petitioned the Government of the Philippines (GoP)  for an 
expansion in the funding of the IRA from 40 percent of internal revenue collections to 50 
percent. Though there is much less than full agreement on this expansion, the possibility of an 
expansion in the funding is now being seriously considered by the executive and legislative 
branches of government.  
 
There appears to be ample consensus within the GoP that if the additional 10 percent in funding 
were to take place, these funds should not be distributed following the same methodology used 
for the IRA.
4
  Two general requirements for implementing the additional 10 percent funding, on 
which there appears to be also wide consensus, are often mentioned.
5
 The first is that the 
additional funds would need to have a much stronger equalization effect among LGUs, that is 
mainly help the relatively poorer ones, than is the case now with
6
 the IRA.
7
 The second is that 
                                                 
2
 These include provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. The latter are the equivalent of boroughs. The 
relationships between the different LGUs and especially those of cities and municipalities with the barangays are 
examined in several essays in Preschle and Sosmeña (2007).  
3
 See DILG (2009) for a recent assessment of the decentralization system in the Philippines.  
4
 See Pardo (2005), Brillantes (2005) and Guevara (2006, 2007) for good discussions of the problems associated 
with the current design of the IRA and proposals for reform. 
5
 The draft Bill on the ―LGU Enhancement Fund‖---not an official name but how it has been referred to—provides 
that the additional 10% of funds should be allocated according to the two criteria of equity and performance. Some 
of the available drafts of the Bill include a concrete split of the 10% funds into 5% for equity adjustments and 5% 
for performance.  
6
 Several proposals have been made for reforming the IRA. The most recent is by JICA(2008). 
7
 See Manasan and Chaterjee (2003) and World Bank (2010) for the existing and (apparently) growing inequality 
and lack of economic convergence across geographical regions in the Philippines. A more recent assessment of the 
impact of decentralization in the Philippines can be found in Brillantes et al. (2010).  
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there should be a considerable increase in accountability for how the recipient LGUs use the 
funds to improve the performance of public services.  
 
These two general thrusts, greater equalization outcomes and improved service delivery 
performance in the use of funds, are widely acknowledged desired goals also for the reform of 
the IRA. However, at the present time, it does not appear that the reform of the IRA is politically 
viable.  
 
Thus, the design of the new transfer -- the fund for ―Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance‖ 
or FEEP--
8
 for 10 percent additional funding as separate from the IRA will have the advantage of 
showing some –or most- of the way for how the IRA itself may be reformed at a future date 
when it becomes more politically feasible. In addition, and as we explore below in more detail, 
the FEEP can easily become a blueprint for the eventual reform of the IRA, if the IRA overall 
allocation is frozen in a hold-harmless position for all LGU recipients in a base year, say 2011, 
and annual nominal increments in the IRA funding are moved to the FEEP.
9
  
 
The design of the FEEP faces four major challenges: 
 
1. How to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10 percent additional 
funding? In particular, should the base of the funding be internal revenue collections, 
as in the case of the IRA, or something different? In this regard, one standing request 
of the associations of LGUs has been to use total central government revenues for the 
IRA. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the different choices, and are 
there other alternatives? 
                                                 
8
 The proposals for this initiative have used in the past the title of  the ― Local Government Enhancement Fund‖ or 
LGEF. This report proposes the new more descriptive name of Fiscal Equity  and Expenditure Performance Fund  or 
FEEP for the transfers but we keep the LGEF in the title of the paper to avoid confusion. 
9
 One issue to take into account may be the proliferation of special funds in the intergovernmental finance system of 
the Philippines. However, the FEEP will have very different features and objectives than other existing funds. The 
Special Education Fund (SEF) was introduced in the Local Government Code of 2001 and earmarks the proceeds 
from an additional 1% tax on real property to support school boards.  See Manasan and Castel (2010) for a 
discussion of issues related to the SEF.  The Performance Challenge Fund (PCF) that is being created for LGUs will 
have considerably smaller funding than the FEEP (P500 million), it will be dedicated to matching high impact 
capital infrastructure projects, and it will follow a completely different approach to LGU performance. The PCF will 
confer a ―Seal of Good Housekeeping‖ (SGH) to pre-qualifying local units focusing on the areas of administrative 
good governance.    
        
                         Designing the Local Government Enhancement Fund for the Philippines                                        9 
 
  
2. How to apportion the additional funding among the different groups of LGUs 
(provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays)? One possibility would be to use the 
current apportionment percentages in the IRA. However, there is the widespread 
perception that the initial arbitrariness of the IRA apportionment percentages is part 
of the problem (causing the significant and increasing fiscal disparities among groups 
of LGUs) and therefore hardly could be part of the solution.  What other options are 
available? 
 
3. What formula to use for the distribution of the additional funds for qualifying LGUs 
in each particular group? Here there seems to be clear the consensus on the need to 
improve the current formula used for the IRA distributions and based on a weighted 
index of population, land area, and equal shares. What seems to be also clear is the 
need for more accurate measurement of the expenditure needs of LGUs (than 
provided by the population, area and equal shares in the IRA formula), and for the 
inclusion of some measure of fiscal revenue capacity (currently entirely ignored in the 
IRA formula).What new formulas and methodologies are feasible given current data 
availability? 
 
4. How to make sure that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their 
service delivery performance?  As opposed to using ex-ante conditionality for the 
additional funds (for example, where the money can be spent, what kind of inputs to 
use, etc.), the goal would be to preserve a high degree of autonomy of LGUs but 
demand from them ex post, say after 3 years of receiving the additional funds, proof 
of improved performance in a number of carefully selected indicators. These 
indicators would need to be measured independently from the LGUs themselves and 
would have to be meaningful in in a significant way in the quality of life of residents. 
Because of very different starting points in most indicators for different LGUs, most 
likely the improvements would need to be read as differentiated changes in those 
indicators. Failure to deliver improved performance in the set period could be 
followed by suspension of half of the available funding. After another round or period 
of performance, for example three more years, the funding could be completely 
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suspended, with continued failure to improve, or fully restored, with increased 
performance. 
 
These will be the four main challenges that will be addressed in a separate chapter of this report. 
The last chapter concludes and summarizes the main policy options open to the GoP.     
 
II.  Defining the origin and computation of the 10 percent additional funding 
 
Even though it is far from certain that the additional funding eventually approved for the FEEP 
will be the equivalent of 10 percent extra on top of the 40 percent now dedicated to the IRA,
10
 it 
will be necessary to make an assumption on that amount to go forward with this study. 
Therefore, henceforth we will assume that the additional funding will be of 10 additional 
percentage points.  
 
Having set that issue, the next question is what should be the source of the 10 percent additional 
funding. From a political-economy perspective it will be important to disassociate as much as 
possible the FEPP and its funding from the IRA so to mute legalist interpretations that since the 
increment in funding is based on the IRA, so should be the distribution formula. That is, it will 
be important to make it clear that the FEEP is not part of the IRA, since it pursues very different 
objectives s with quite different means. There are several alternatives that can be explored to 
determine the funding rule for the FEEP: 
 
(a)  Using the same base as for the IRA.  
 
A simple answer is to make use of the current arrangement under the IRA and to increase the 
allotment from the current 40 percent of the IRA to 50 percent. This funding is based on 
collections from the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Under the Code, the internal 
revenue taxes-- or taxes collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue-- include all income taxes, 
transfer taxes, excise taxes on domestic trade, VAT on domestic trade, other business taxes, 
documentary stamp tax and other miscellaneous taxes. The advantages of this approach are 
                                                 
10
 In our preliminary meetings other figures were mentioned including, for example, an additional funding of only 5 
percent.  
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several. It is the simplest and it can use the ‗machinery‘ already in place for the distribution of 
the IRA. It also would preserve certain revenue sources, such as customs revenues and fuel taxes, 
for the central government. But this approach also presents several disadvantages. It links too 
directly and explicitly the FEEP with the existing IRA and this can create problems down the 
road when the formula for the distribution of funds will differ between the two. In addition, it 
may not be the most responsive to the requests for additional funding from the associations of 
LGUs which have also been requesting for some time the broadening of the IRA base to all 
national tax revenues, including customs taxes and taxes on fuel.    
 
(b)  Using an expanded base from central government total revenues. 
 
This alternative would use a broader base, specifically all central government revenues—this 
including customs taxes and fuel taxes, among others— to compute the 10 percent equivalent in 
additional funding for the FEEP. We can call this base NTR, for national tax revenues. In 
absolute terms for the base year this would mean the same exact revenues as in alternative (a). 
Thus rather than adding 10 percentage points to the IRA computation, the same amount of funds 
would be derived by multiplying national tax revenues (NTR) by some x percent. However, over 
time the absolute amount in pesos could become different if that initial x percent is kept and the 
national revenues (NTR) and internal revenues (NIRC) evolve differently.  This approach would 
have the advantage of partially fulfilling one standing request of the associations of LGUs to use 
total central government revenues for the IRA. The possible disadvantages would include a 
potential larger commitment of funds by the central government over time.  
 
(c)  Other less conventional approaches to funding. 
 
There are some other variations in the approach to funding that may be at least worth considering 
as ways to address some existing problems with the IRA.  
 
One possibility would be to freeze the funding of the IRA as of 2011, for example, holding 
harmless all LGUs in the future years to the same funding in absolute numbers that they had in 
2011 and utilizing the increases in nominal pesos from the 40 percent formula for the IRA to 
finance and expand FEEP. This would mean that the importance of the FEEP vis-à-vis the IRA 
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would increase over the years. In this way, the FEEP would become a good experiment for 
signaling the way for the reform of the IRA from outside-in.  Since the IRA produces 
unsatisfactory results in terms of equalization and performance accountability, significant 
advances in those two fronts could take place with an expanding FEEP. 
 
A second possibility would be to shift some of the resources currently distributed through the 
National Government conditional transfers to the FEEP. In particular, there appear to be special 
funds in the budgets of sectoral agencies (e.g., Agriculture) that are either unused or inefficiently 
utilized.  
   
A third possibility would be to consider the introduction of negative transfers from better-off 
LGUs to the FEEP fund. A good number of countries around the world finance their equalization 
grants fully or partially with what is known ‗fraternal‘ systems (also known as Robin Hood 
systems) of finance. Here those LGUs which have a negative fiscal gap (defined as the difference 
between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity) are required to contribute to a centrally managed 
equalization fund. In this sense, those LGUs have negative transfers. As explained in Section 
Four below, there are several methodologies that can be used to estimate fiscal gaps for each 
LGU. Introducing such a system in the Philippines would have the advantage of further 
correcting the perceived inequities in the IRA; thus, it would be likely that rich cities and a few 
other well-off LGUs would have to contribute negative transfers. This approach would have the 
potential of significantly lowering the fiscal costs to the central government of introducing the 
FEEP. On the disadvantage side, this approach would pretty much imply the reform of the IRA, 
for, there is wide consensus, will be politically unviable. The introduction of a fraternal system 
of finance, being new to the Philippines, may face strong opposition by LGUs that would be 
potentially losers and end up being too divisive politically.  
 
The two more feasible strategies for funding the FEEP would seem to be either (a) using the 
same bases as for the IRA or (b) expanding the base to national total revenues.  As we have seen, 
both these approaches offer advantages and disadvantages. In the next paragraphs we look in 
more detail at the properties of those two bases from a historical perspective. Even though option 
(b) would include a wider revenue base, since it would include customs revenues and fuel taxes, 
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it is not clear that it would be superior to the internal revenue base in (a) from all perspectives, 
such as stability and predictability.  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
In terms of revenue trends, customs taxes represent a declining revenue source in general 
because it is quite likely that trade and tariff reforms in the future will continue to lower the level 
and narrow the dispersion of tariff rates. This trend is illustrated in Figure 1 for a group of Asian 
countries using IMF data for 1972-2005, where it can be seen that the share of customs taxes (the 
largest component by far of taxes on international trade) has decreased vis-à-vis the shares of 
income taxes and taxes on goods and services.
11
  The declining relative importance over time of 
taxes on international trade is not an exclusive phenomenon for Asian countries but can be 
observed in practically all regions of the world, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
                                                 
11
 The data are from the IMF-GFS statistics and originally reported in Martinez-Vazquez (2010). Note that the 
Philippines are not included in the group of Asian countries as the IMF-GFS data source does not carry information 
for the Philippines. 
Taxation In Asia
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Figure 2 
 
 
But offsetting that expected declining trend in customs taxes we need to take into account the 
increasing trends in other taxes collected at customs, which go well beyond the customs tariff 
itself.  The revenues collected by the Customs Administration include also the VAT and all 
excises falling on imported commodities, not the least excises on fuel products. Clearly, revenues 
from these sources (VAT and excises) collected by the Customs Administration can dwarf the 
revenues coming from the import tariff. It is not infrequent to find in many developing countries 
that approximately half of VAT revenues are collected by customs offices. And for excises, that 
share can be even higher. As can be seen in Figure 1, the trend in Asian countries is for taxes on 
goods and services to continue to increase their share in total tax revenues at the expense of 
customs taxes and also income taxes.   
 
The next question is, however, whether expanding the revenue base of the FEEP to national total 
revenues would expose recipient LGUs to greater volatility and unpredictability than in the case 
in which the internal revenue base were used. The issues of volatility and predictability, not only 
Taxation In Asia
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the total pool of resources, were in the minds of the designers of the IRA since the funds actually 
distributed in any one year correspond to the internal revenue collections of the years back.   
Table 1. Philippines: Variation in Total Central Government Revenues and Selected Tax 
Revenues, 1990-2007 
  
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Coefficient 
of Variation Minimum Maximum 
Total Revenue 1.5 16.5 0.09 14.4 19.1 
Personal Income Tax 0.4 2.2 0.20 1.5 3.4 
Corporate Income Tax 0.4 2.6 0.16 1.8 3.6 
General Sales Tax 0.2 1.8 0.13 1.5 2.3 
Excise Duties 0.6 2.5 0.24 1.5 3.4 
Customs Duties 1.0 3.6 0.29 2.4 5.2 
Source: Author's calculations based on the IMF GFS Data 
 
Some components of the revenues collected by the Customs Administration, such as for 
example, excise tax on fuels, can exhibit greater volatility than internal or domestically collected 
taxes.  This is the question examined in Table 1 and illustrated in Figures 3-A and 3-B. While 
Figure 3-A uses data from the International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS), Figure 3-B uses from the Department of Finance; note that the breakdowns of the revenue 
components are different in the two data bases and that in the case of the Department of Finance, 
we have data through 2009 (as opposed to 2007 for the GFS data).   We can see that the two 
measures of dispersion, the Standard Deviation and the Coefficient of Variation, for annual 
revenue flows of individual revenue components for the period 1990-2007 are the largest for 
Customs Duties. Even though, the Standard Deviation for Total Revenue is higher, once 
normalized by the Mean Value, the Coefficient of Variation for Total Revenue is quite smaller 
than the one of Customs Duties. Since the revenues from Customs Duties are likely highly 
correlated with the General Sales Tax and Excise Duties collected at Customs, we could infer 
that those revenues would also exhibit more volatility than ―internal revenues,‖ including the 
revenues from the General Sales Tax and Excise Duties collected by the Internal Revenue 
Department. For the petroleum tax a separate time series is not available. However, a large part 
of this tax is collected upon importation and its revenues (and volatility) and incorporated in the 
Excise Duties collected at Customs.   
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Figure 3-A 
 
 
Figure 3-B  
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In Figure 4 we show the time evolution of the two possible bases, Internal Revenues (NIRC) 
versus Total Revenues (NTR). We can see that, independently of the total amounts, largely the 
two series follow each other quite closely. The coefficient of variation for NTR is 0.103 and for 
NIRC 0.092. Therefore, expanding the computation base for the FEEP to total national revenues 
(from internal revenues used now for the IRA) will only slightly increase the overall volatility of 
this transfer with some increased uncertainty and unpredictability for the recipient LGUs.  This 
additional factor should be taken into account in deciding the computational base of the FEEP. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
III. Apportioning the additional funding among the different groups of LGUs (provinces, 
cities, municipalities, and barangays) 
 
In this section we want to address the vertical distribution of the FEEP among the four groups of 
LGUs. To inform the discussion we will first review the vertical distribution formula for the 
IRA. Next, we will discuss how different the vertical distribution of the FEEP should be and the 
difficulties for arriving at a concrete answer. 
 
Currently, the IRA is subject to a vertical distribution formula that provides 23 percent of the 
funds to provincial governments, 23 percent of the funds to the cities, 34 percent to the 
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municipalities, and 20 percent to the barangays. This vertical distribution formula of the IRA 
appears to have been the product of political compromise at the time of the law‘s approval in 
parliament as opposed to any calculated weighing of the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of 
the different groups of LGUs.  
 
Of course, the choice of vertical distribution shares for the IRA has had important consequences 
on the overall performance of that transfer. In particular, there is a widely shared perception that 
the share of the overall funds assigned to municipalities has been insufficient and has caused 
many municipalities to operate with grave fiscal conditions. The perception is also that 
something similar, although probably not of the same intensity, can be said for the provinces, 
many of which seem to be operating with significant difficulties too. On the contrary, it seems 
like cities, and in particular the bigger and richer cities, have been enjoying funds beyond their 
needs, even though there are smaller and relatively poorer cities that are not so well off.  For the 
barangays the general perception is that there are no alarming issues of financing and that overall 
they are doing better than fine with the IRA.  
 
We must note that the relative poor position of LGUs within each group reflects the fact that the 
current IRA horizontal distribution formula may not capture well the expenditure needs of the 
units and also the fact that it does not capture at all differences in tax or revenue capacity of the 
units. However, what we are referring to in this section is to the fact that the current percent 
shares would not seem to reflect the overall aggregate differences in expenditure needs and fiscal 
capacity. As a result there appear to be many more municipalities and provinces in dire needs 
that there are cities.
12
    
 
Unfortunately, the statements above are conjectures based on field observations of different 
stakeholders of the decentralization system in the Philippines as opposed to the results of hard 
calculations. Even if there seems to be ample consensus on the empirical validity of those 
conjectures, they are not more than that, conjectures. 
 
                                                 
12
 And this does not mean that there are not cities in dire need.  In fact many small cities appear also to have 
significant fiscal difficulties. 
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This is significant for the vertical allocation of the FEEP because without hard evidence on 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of the different LGUs we lack sound basis to recommend 
any specific vertical allocation rule.  
 
At this stage, there are two alternative ways to proceed. One approach, which we could call one 
of ‗rough justice‘ would be to vertically allocate the FEEP only among those groups of LGUs 
that seem to be in more dire fiscal situations: the municipalities and the provinces. Then, some 
rule would need to be found to divide the FEEP between those two groups; for example two-
thirds for municipalities and one-third for the provinces, or 50-50, or something else. Again we 
lack sound bases to propose a specific cut. The advantage of this approach would be its 
simplicity and ease of applications. As disadvantages, it may be politically too divisive as there 
are relatively poor and smaller cities that would be left out of the additional funds. Also 
barangays may strongly object when the entire group is left out of any additional financing.  
 
A second approach would be to devise transparent methodologies for estimating the differences 
between expenditure needs and fiscal capacity (or fiscal gaps) for LGUs in each group. A couple 
of such approaches are proposed in the next section of this report where we discuss the 
horizontal distribution of the FEEP. Obtaining a fiscal gap for each unit allows us to aggregate 
all the positive gaps (that is for those units for which the estimates of expenditure need exceed 
the estimate of fiscal capacity) in each group. Thus, in theory it would seem like one could use 
those aggregate estimates to redo the vertical distribution formula of the FEEP and possibly of 
the IRA, sometime in the future). However, as we will see in the next section of the report, at this 
stage the estimates of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity will be conditional to the level of 
resources available to each group of LGUs as a whole. This means that the estimates of fiscal 
gaps we will be obtaining are not independent of the existing vertical distribution formula for the 
IRA. Nevertheless, we expect that the information we will obtain from the computation of the 
fiscal gaps for the units in each sub-group could be helpful in deciding on the direction for the 
desirable reform of  the vertical distribution formula of the IRA, and therefore for its application 
to the FEEP. In the future, using the methodologies introduced in this paper, it will be possible to 
develop estimates of the fiscal gap that are independent of the IRA distribution formula. That 
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will require making normative decisions about standard expenditure needs, which are only the 
prerogative of the Government.        
 
IV. Alternative formula for the distribution of the additional funds to qualifying LGUs  
 
The horizontal distribution formula for the IRA uses a weighted index approach with three 
variables: population, land area, and equal sharing.  In the case of provinces, cities and 
municipalities the weights are 50 percent for population, 25 percent for land area and 25 percent 
for equal sharing. For the case of barangays, only two variables are used: population with a 
weight of 60 percent and equal sharing with a weight of 40 percent. 
 
Quite clearly the overall intent of the IRA is to work as a general allocation transfer to address a 
supposedly large vertical imbalance for LGUs regarding their expenditure obligations and 
autonomous revenue sources.
13
 In this sense, the IRA would appear to have performed 
satisfactorily, even when there is not a good measure of expenditure needs by the different 
groups of LGUs, and therefore a good measure of vertical imbalance. 
 
Where there also appears to be considerable consensus is that the IRA has been defective in 
addressing horizontal imbalances in expenditure needs and fiscal capacities both across groups of 
LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) and within each of these groups.  
 
A priori, the reasons for this failure to address horizontal imbalances are rather apparent.  
 
Across groups of LGUs, the vertical share allocation, as we saw in the previous section, did not 
take into account either aggregate expenditure needs or aggregate fiscal capacity of each group.  
 
Within each group, the IRA horizontal allocation formula only partially takes into account the 
expenditure needs of each unit within the group and completely ignores the fiscal capacity issue. 
In particular, and leaving the choice of weights aside, the population and land area variables are 
                                                 
13
 The vertical fiscal imbalance refers to the difference in fiscal gaps (expenditure needs minus fiscal capacity) 
between the central government and the aggregate of sub-national governments. Usually the central government has 
a negative fiscal gap (potential revenue exceeds expenditure need). The sub-national governments have a positive 
gap (with expenditure needs exceeding their own revenue capacity). The vertical imbalance is thus closed by using 
transfers from the central to sub-national governments.  
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likely able to capture differences in expenditure needs but not all the relevant differences. For 
example, different population groups, such as the very young, the elderly or the poor imply 
different needs than the regular adult population. There may also be differences in the unit costs 
for the delivery of different services because of geography (mountain, isolated islands, etc.) or 
population density or proximity conditions. 
 
In addition the equal sharing is less likely to reflect expenditure need differences. The use of this 
variable in the formula may be justified because of the fixed costs of operating a government unit 
given that smaller units are not able to capture economies of scale in the operation of services. 
However, this type of variable tends to benefit smaller units in an exaggerated way, especially 
when the weight attached to this variable is relatively large, and at the same time tends to provide 
a perverse incentive against  jurisdictional consolidation if not a further incentive toward further 
jurisdictional fragmentation.  
 
Perhaps because of those reasons explained above, the IRA has failed to equalize enough within 
each group of LGUs. That is, there is also a generalized perception that even in the group that 
appears to be best off, the cities, there are units that are struggling to meet their demands for 
services (smaller and more geographically distant cities), while there are other units (large cities) 
that would seem to be much better off and with very substantial reserves of funds that even 
overwhelm in size any IRA allocations. 
 
Therefore, it would seem to be clear that if the FEEP is to achieve greater equity across LGUs, 
the current IRA horizontal distribution formula cannot be used for the allocation of its additional 
funds. 
 
To advance in the direction of a more equitable distribution of funds there is a need to meet two 
main requirements:  first, an improved measurement or approximation to the expenditure needs 
of each LGU; second, the incorporation of some measurement (or approximation) of the fiscal 
capacity of each LGU. 
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The theory and best international practices in the design of equalization grants should be of help 
if defining those two elements, expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, in the design of the 
horizontal distribution formula for the FEEP. Therefore, in the following paragraphs we will 
review the different options available for quantifying expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and 
how those measures may be put together into a formula.  Finally in this section, we will present 
some preliminary numerical simulations using available data to quantify expenditure needs and 
fiscal capacity and for implementing the several options of the FEEP horizontal distribution 
formula.  
 
But before we discuss the approaches to measuring expenditure needs and fiscal capacity to 
compute the fiscal gap for each local unit, we discuss a minimum first approach which is 
basically a weighted index approach.   
 
Simpler approach--Expanding the weighted index formula in the IRA 
 
This is the approach currently used for the IRA. The difference will be that in the proposed 
approach we will include an additional variable for better approximating expenditure needs and 
we will also include as an additional variable which is a proxy for fiscal capacity. However, it 
must be noted that this approach falls short of computing a fiscal gap for each local unit and 
therefore it will not do more than just distributing the pool of available funds by formula. But 
yes, the distribution of funds will be more equalizing because it does take into account 
differences in fiscal capacity and it provides better bases to approximate expenditure needs. Even 
though we will present only one index formula applicable to the three subgroups of LGUs 
(Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities), conceivably a separate index could be used for each 
subgroup. This is so because the factors included in the index try to approximate the 
fundamentals behind expenditure needs for each subgroup. Since the expenditure responsibilities 
and therefore the expenditure needs of each subgroup can differ, the factors capturing those 
needs could also differ.  
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The extended index approach could look like follows: 
14
 
 
AIi = λ1(Popi/ΣPopi) + λ2(Areai/ΣAreai) + λ3 (YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi)   
+ λ4 (OldPopi/ΣOldPopi) + λ5(PovPopi/ΣPovPopi) + λ6 (RFCi) 
 
Actual FEEP transfer to local unit i = FEEPi    = AIi  x Total pool of funds available for the 
FEEP transfer in each subgroup of LGUs (Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities)
15
 
where, 
AIi  : allocation index (or participation share in the pool of funds, in percentage terms) 
for jurisdiction i in the total pool available for transfers for each subgroup 
Popi/ΣPopi : share of population for jurisdiction i in the total population computed for each 
subgroup Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities) 
Areai/ΣAreai : share of urban area for jurisdiction i in the total area for each subgroup 
Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities) 
YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi: share of population under 5 years of age for jurisdiction i in the 
total population computed for each subgroup Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities) 
OldPopi/ΣOldPopi: share of population over 65 years of age for jurisdiction i in the total 
population computed for each subgroup Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities) 
PovPopi/ΣPovPopi: share of population living in poverty for jurisdiction i in the total 
population computed for each subgroup Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities) 
RFCi (Relative Fiscal Capacityi) = [Max FC - FCi] / Σ [Max FC – Average FC] 
                                                 
14
 It should be clear that the contribution here is the proposition of an expanded index formula that is more all-
encompassing of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. The actual additional factors included should be treated at 
this stage more like an example of what can be done than a firm proposal of how a final index formula would look. 
Other factors may be included as relevant and for which we can obtain objective reliable data. One set of factors not 
captured in the index formula but which may be quite relevant are those measuring cost differences across 
jurisdictions in the provision of public services.  
15
 As mentioned, the barangays are not included in the discussion. However if they were to be included, the 
expanded formula here could be adapted to the information available for barangays, as is now the case in the IRA 
transfer. 
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Where ‗Fiscal Capacity‘ is being measured as indicated in the next sub-section of the report, 
and where   
λ1 …… λ6 : relative weights for each of the factors in the formula  
          λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6  = 1, and  
       Σ AIi = 1 
Two sets of decisions are important to make this approach operational. First, we need to decide 
what the proper values of the weights are for each of the factors in the formula. Second we need 
to decide how the pool of available funds for the FEEP will be divided among the subgroups of t 
LGUs. And unfortunately, there are no clear exact objective criteria that can guide us through 
either of these choices.    
 
The selection of the weight factors (λ1, λ2, etc.) involves both technical and inescapably political-
judgmental elements. Expert technical analysis within the Philippines from those that intimately 
know LGU budgets must be used to gauge the relative importance of population, land area, and 
so on in the determination of expenditure needs.
16
 Note that the factors approximating 
expenditure needs are those from 1 to 5.
17
 In the same manner, technical expertise should be used 
in assessing the impact of fiscal capacity in the relative position (truly, the fiscal gap) for the 
different LGUs. This is approximated with factor 6. And naturally the stronger weight we give to 
fiscal capacity the smaller the aggregate weight we will give to expenditure needs. This follows 
clearly from the condition that λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + λ5 + λ6 = 1and so that λ6 = 1- (λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 + 
λ5).  
  
                                                 
16
 See Appendix 1 for a discussion of the potential rationales behind the weight factors. 
17
 Of course, other factors could be included and even some could be excluded.  Here we are just using best 
judgment based on international practice and what are the current data constraints. The variable measuring relative 
poverty PovPopi/ΣPovPopi is taken here to approximate certain forms of expenditure needs. However, this variable 
could also be taken to capture some elements of fiscal capacity, but this is not being done here. Fiscal capacity is 
being measured independently through the RFC variable. 
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For the purpose of the numerical simulations here we will assume the following values for the 
weights, but obviously these values are subject to revision and sensitivity analysis: 
λ1 = 0.35 
λ2 = 0.10 
λ3 = 0.10 
λ4 = 0.10   
λ5 = 0.10 
λ6 = 0.25 
 
Regarding the partition of the available FEEP funds among the different subgroups of LGUs, 
there is no clear objective way to do it without computing fiscal gaps for the local units. At this 
stage there are several options that are available: (a) use the same vertical apportionment as in 
the IRA; (b) exclude the barangays and divide the available funds between the other three 
subgroups, and here the options are multiple of course; (c) exclude also the cities as a subgroup 
and use the FEEP funds only for the subgroups of LGUs that are widely acknowledged to be in 
most need; but again the options on how to apportion the funds among the provinces and 
municipalities are many. Of course, the consequences of selecting one vertical apportionment 
rule or another are of much consequence. Here, and just for illustration purposes, we will assume 
that the rule applied is (b) and where we just apportion the 20 percent of the barangays in the 
IRA proportionally (as in the IRA) to the other three subgroups so that we end up with 28.75 
percent of the funds going to the provinces, 28.75 percent of the funds going to the cities, and 
42.50 percent of the funds going to the municipalities.  
 
Using the most recent data available for 2008, the summary statistics for the FEEP transfers to 
three subgroups of LGUs are shown in Table 2, where we use the adjusted weighted index 
formula for the horizontal distribution within each group and the adjusted IRA vertical 
distribution, as discussed above to apportion the available funds between the three subgroups. 
For the pool of FEEP funds to be distributed (in 2008) we use the figure of PhP 53,484.3 million 
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for an IRA pool of funds PhP 213,937.2 million. An example of the necessary computations is 
shown in Appendix 4 for the case of (some) provinces.
18
 
 
Table 2. Per capita FEEP Transfers under Adjusted Weighted Index Horizontal 
Distribution Formula and Adjusted IRA Vertical Distribution Rule  
(simulated for 2008 and in PhP) 
 Provinces Cities Municipalities 
    
Min 140.21 258.26 219.75 
Max 704.98 1,179.76 19,507.67 
Average 288.94 648.14 540.07 
Standard deviation 117.22 235.74 579.02 
Coeff. of variation 0.41 0.36 1.07 
Total FEEP transfers 
(in million PhP) 
15,376.74 15,376. 74 22,730.83 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Distributing the FEEP funds on the basis of estimated fiscal gaps of LGUs 
 
What we propose in this section is a different approach which represents a significant departure 
from the index approach used in the IRA. This alternative approach is based on the estimation 
for each LGU of a fiscal gap as the difference between its expenditure needs (arising from the 
current assignment of expenditure responsibilities) and its fiscal capacity (based on own 
revenues and also all received transfers and revenue sharing).  
 
Fiscal Gapi = Expenditure Needsi – Fiscal Capacityi 
 
The definition and computation of Expenditure Needs and Fiscal Capacity is addressed 
immediately below, but before we get into those details we will review first how the Fiscal Gap 
measures will be used. Note that Fiscal Capacity will be measuring all the ―Potential Available 
Resources‖ to the local unit other than the specific transfer we are trying to determine or 
                                                 
18
 Note that the maximum value for the municipalities is an outlier due to the current data for Kalayaan municipality, 
which belongs to the province of Palawan (Region IV-B). This municipality, which appears to be a tourist resort, is 
reported to have a population of 53 but relatively large revenues and expenditures.  
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distribute, so it will include the ―Own Fiscal Capacity‖ coming from own taxes and fees and 
include as well any shared revenues and all transfers, including the IRA. 
 
Definition and uses of the fiscal gap. 
First, the expression for the Fiscal Gap needs to be estimated for each LGU in each of the three 
groups of LGUs: Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities. 
 
For every local unit (within each subgroup) that does not have a positive fiscal gap (FGi <0), we 
set FGi=0. 
 
In this form we will be able to define an aggregate fiscal gap for each subgroup  
 
Σ Fiscal Gapi for (Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities)   
 
It is important to note that we are estimating an aggregate fiscal gap for each subgroup and that 
even though they all are measured in PhP, the aggregates for the subgroups are not necessarily 
comparable because the processes used to estimate expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are 
conditional on the existing data and the averages for each group. What this means is that 
necessarily there would be some LGUs in each subgroup with positive fiscal gaps, thus 
indicating a need for additional financing, when it may be possible that in some normative 
absolute terms all or most LGUs in one subgroup can be in better financial positions than all or 
most LGUs in another subgroup. As we will see, the methodologies discussed below can provide 
the basis for those normative comparisons, but clearly, this report will not introduce any 
normative absolute standards for LGUs. 
 
Nevertheless the aggregate fiscal gap for each subgroup of LGUs will tell a story about the 
number of LGUs in each group that appear to be in a deficit (or positive fiscal gap) situation and 
what this total amount is. So, in principle those aggregate amounts can help to inform changes in 
the apportionment of the available funds in the FEEP across provinces, cities, and municipalities. 
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Using the fiscal gap as a distribution formula.  
In addition (or alternatively) the aggregate fiscal gap for each subgroup can be used to distribute 
the funds from the FEEP if we are willing to accept a vertical distribution of these funds as used 
currently in the IRA or other vertical apportionments discussed in the previous section. To see 
how this would work, we would proceed in two steps for each subgroup of LGUs: 
 
(a) Define Relative Fiscal Gap 
The relative fiscal gap is the relative size of each locality‘s fiscal gap as a share of the aggregate 
fiscal gaps of all localities: 
Relative Fiscal Gapi  = Fiscal Gap i   /   Σ Fiscal Gap j 
 
(b) Assign Equalization Transfer 
Define the equalization transfer to local government i as: 
FEEP Transfer to Locality i = Relative Fiscal Gap i  * Part of FEEP funds for the subgroup of 
LGUs.
19
 
 
Notice that differently from the extended index approach discussed above, using the fiscal gap 
approach will not produce a FEEP transfer for each local unit in the group. Instead, only those 
local units with a positive fiscal gap would be a recipient of the FEEP funds. This will have the 
obvious advantage of being more equalizing since only those units that cannot cover their 
expenditure needs with the available resources would get the grant. 
 
For illustration purposes we will assume that the vertical distribution rule for the FEEP is the 
same as the one used above to illustrate the working of the extended index approach, so that 
28.75 percent of the FEEP funds go to the provinces, 28.75 percent go to the cities, and 42.50 
percent go to the municipalities. These simulations are shown further down after the review and 
application of the methodologies to compute expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. 
                                                 
19
 Instead of a proportional approach, we could use a minimax approach to the final allocation of transfers. With this 
approach we should imagine local units in each subgroup sorted in ascending order by the size of their fiscal 
disparities. The idea would be to start ―from the bottom‖, allocating transfers first to those local units with the 
largest fiscal gap and then moving up the ranks. We would exhaust the pool of available FEEP funds so that the last 
local unit receiving the grant funds would report a fiscal gap exactly equal to all those below. Note that not all those 
local units with a positive fiscal gap may receive funds under this approach to apportioning the available funds. 
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Measuring expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.  
In practice there are a handful of methods that can be used to estimate expenditure needs. 
Something similar holds for fiscal capacity. These methods used in the international practice are 
summarized in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, respectively. Here we will discuss and attempt to 
apply two of each  
 
Approaches to estimating expenditure needs  
 
Below we review two possible approaches to estimate the expenditure needs of LGUs. 
 
Estimation of expenditure needs using per client expenditure norms (EN1) 
The essence of this methodology is to determine for each significant functional service of the 
LGU a financial standard or norm per client or user of the service (for example, if the local 
government were responsible for elementary education, how many PhP per year would be 
allocated for each elementary school student in the Philippines; this amount could be adjusted up 
or down with a cost index for delivering this service).
20
 This is essentially informed by practice 
but also normative budgeting approach in which the authorities establishing budget priorities 
determine how much is desirable and affordable to spend on different services. As budget 
priorities change over time so would the per client expenditure norms for different services. The 
apparent problem is that no one has stated what these financial per client norms should be for 
any service in the Philippines. However, the actual historical data, for example, the actual 
executed budgets of last year contain all the necessary data to compute the implicit per-client 
financial norms (following the same example, the (implicit) budget norm for elementary 
education can be obtained as the total sum spent on elementary education by all local 
governments in the country divided by the total number of elementary school children in the 
country. Note that expenditure norm is common to all local units (in the absence of variations in 
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 This determination of the per-client expenditure norm can be done top-down and bottom-up. As discussed in 
Appendix 2, a bottom-up methodology relies on the costing of the different elements of the service related to some 
physical standards. This approach requires a lot of time and economic effort to put together and it risks arriving at 
per user/client standards that are essentially unaffordable. What we proceed to discuss and illustrate is a bottom-
down approach.   
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cost provision).
21
 Once the methodology gets established using historical budget data, as we will 
do here, the budget norms can be changed in every budget period.  
 
The concept of potential users or clients deserves special attention: by users or clients we mean 
all possible recipients of the services provided by a municipal government, which do not 
necessarily correspond to the total population but could also represent a specific segment, such 
as the elderly, students, the population of a particular geographic area, etc. Additionally, it is 
important to distinguish between the potential users and those actually benefiting from the 
services, since the last group might exclude eligible users due to, for instance, budgetary 
limitations. Expenditure needs must be computed taking into account all eligible inhabitants (still 
using our elementary education example, this means that the potential users include all children 
of elementary school age, whether or not enrolled).  
 
The practical steps are as follow: 
 
Step 1: Determination of the expenditure aggregates or envelopes for each local unit function.  
 
The application of this methodology requires the classification of municipal expenditures in 
terms of the functions or services that the law has defined as a responsibility of local government 
units, as well as demographic information to identify the amount of users from each of these 
services.  
 
The methodology of expenditure norms by client requires establishing the total amount of 
resources actually spent (and in future years what the central government will determine) for 
each local service or function. In order to make the procedure even simpler, it is possible to 
group those functions with common users, or alternatively, to choose only the most important 
ones, while the number of users for the remaining functions is assumed to be equal to the 
                                                 
21
 This methodology and others that are used to estimate expenditure needs are budget preparation tools. In terms of 
budget execution, the client-based expenditure norm may have a prescriptive character, forcing local governments to 
spend according to the established norm, or it may just be optional, in which case the local governments are allowed 
to decide a different amount of expenditure per client. The international practice on this is varied. 
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population. Using historical expenditure data has the advantage of being feasible, because it is 
based on effective expenditures incurred in the provision of local services in the country.
22
  
 
The budget data for 2008 identify nine functional categories of local public expenditure: 1) 
general public service 2) education, culture and sports 3) health, nutrition and population control 
4) labor and employment 5) housing and community development 6) social security/social 
service and welfare 7) economic services 8) debt servicing, and 9) other purposes. The 
estimation of expenditure needs under the per-client expenditure norms methodology requires 
the calculation of the numbers of the clients for each of the above categories of expenditures.  
 
Local expenditure on general public service cannot be assigned to a particular demographic 
group. Instead, this function benefits the community as a whole. We therefore define the total 
population in the locality as the client base for this service. For similar reasons, we assume 
economic service, debt servicing, and other expenditures are also spread among the whole 
population of the locality.  
 
In the case of education, culture and sports, local governments are generally responsible for the 
provision of public school servicing, which include public kindergarten, primary schools and 
high schools. Therefore, we define a range of population between ages 4-17 years as the number 
of potential clients for education services. On the services of culture and sport, we assume in our 
analysis that the users of these services are concentrated in the adult population before 
retirement, which covers the range between 18-65. In sum, we consider a range of 4-65 as the 
potential client numbers for this expenditure category.  
 
The benefits of local expenditure in the area of health, nutrition and population control are 
mainly limited to some specific groups, such as children, the elderly. However, services are 
sometimes also provided to a more broad population. To capture this, we define a weighted 
population, with double weights for population under 5 years of age and over 65 year of age and 
                                                 
22
 If the potential users are more than those historically benefited, the historical expenditure starting point could 
become an unfeasible standard. 
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a single weight for the rest of the population (4-65), as the potential client numbers of this 
expenditure category.  
 
Services for labor and employment are clearly oriented to the adult population before retirement, 
so we estimate the number of potential clients as the number of population with ages between 18 
and 65.  
 
The expenditure on housing and community development include services such as water supply 
and sanitation, public lighting, natural gas infrastructure, and other communal services. In 
general, most of these public services benefit entire families, especially poor families, rather than 
a particular age or demographic group. Therefore, we use the number of poor households as an 
indicator of need and develop our expenditure norm for housing and community development 
services on that basis.
23
 
 
Social security/social service and welfare is probably the expenditure function for which the 
client base is more difficult to define. Services in this category are oriented to the assistance of 
very specific groups, including the elderly, the handicapped and also children from troubled 
social environments. Payments are sometimes also expensed to the unemployed and widowers. 
At this time, due to limited data availability, we are unable to explicitly account for the different 
client groups or their intensity of use of these services. Therefore, we will assume the elderly is 
the most important group among the beneficiaries of social security, and use the number of 
inhabitants over 65 years old as the potential client base for these services. 
 
Let us note that it would be impractical and even misleading to try to define a per-client norm for 
every single category of local expenditures. A large number of expenditure standards would 
reduce transparency in the system and enhance the likelihood of complex discussions about the 
proper client bases. In general, under ―other expenditures‖ we find that some functions are 
unimportant in budgetary terms, as well as a varied combination of beneficiaries, so the local 
population is again the best option to estimate the number of clients. 
                                                 
23
  Poverty data for provinces are available for year 2009. However, these data are only available for year 2003 for 
cities and municipalities. In the simulation analysis, we rely on the data we have.  
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Step 2: Computation of per-client expenditure norm for each local function.  
 
Here the expenditure aggregate (at the national level—covering all local units) for each function 
is divided by the number of potential clients (also at the national level) of the services being 
delivered.  This needs to be done for each of the functional areas, covering the entire budget of 
the local units. Naturally, the difficulty of this step lies in the identification of potential clients 
for each service. For example, for education, the client base is logically school-age population. 
For health, a client base can be built that overweighs the very young and elderly populations. For 
social services for the poor the client base would be population living in poverty. And so on. The 
entire population can be used as the default client base for those functions that cannot be 
allocated to particular groups. It must be noted that the criteria opted for in the estimation of the 
number of clients per expenditure category, although well aligned with current international 
practice, are of course subject to improvements and intended to serve as mere examples of how 
the per client expenditure norms should ideally be designed. In general, it is crucial to have well 
defined expenditure responsibilities
24
  
 
Step 3: Computation of expenditure needs for each function in each local unit. 
 
Quite simply, this can be obtained by multiplying the per-client expenditure norm for each local 
function by the client base for that function in the local unit. 
 
Step 4:  Computation of the total expenditures needs for each local government unit. 
 
This corresponds simply to the sum of the expenditure needs for each function in each local unit. 
 
Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 present the summary of the selected expenditure categories with 
their respective of estimated number of clients, together with the respective per client 
expenditure norm.  
 
  
                                                 
24
 It is important to note again that the standards per client can be easily adjusted upward or downward to the 
different costs of provisions of a particular service by applying a relative cost index to the standard. At the present 
time, we have no reliable data on cost differences for service delivery and therefore no such adjustments are 
performed. 
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Table 3. The computation of expenditure norms for provinces (2008 values, in Ph Pesos) 
Expenditure category 
Aggregate 
expenditures 
needs 
(total exps. 2008) 
Estimated 
aggregate 
number of 
clients 
Per client 
expenditure 
norm 
    
General public services  20,953,886,720 68,607,096 305.42 
Education, culture and sports 2,315,550,208 57,524,236 40.25 
Health, nutrition and population 
control 9,033,858,048 
20,681,986 
436.80 
Labor and employment 30,161,374 36,050,832 0.84 
Housing and community development 827,712,832 3,781,205 218.90 
Social security/social service and 
welfare 972983,232 
3,030,817 
321.03 
Economic services 9,900,763,136 68,607,096 144.31 
Debt servicing 1,594,355,840 68,607,096 23.24 
Other purposes 10,519,157,760 68,607,096 153.32 
Source: Authors‘ own calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The computation of expenditure norms for cities (2008 values, in Ph Pesos) 
Expenditure category 
Aggregate 
expenditures 
needs 
(total exps. 2008) 
Estimated 
aggregate 
number of 
clients 
Per client 
expenditure 
norm 
    
General public services  39,109,013,504 32,957,168 1,186.66 
Education, culture and sports 9,308,789,760 27,868,748 334.02 
Health, nutrition and population 
control 
7,384,459,264 
9,508,969 776.58 
Labor and employment 45,499,684 18,663,172 2.44 
Housing and community development 3182292480 4314455 737.59 
Social security/social service and 
welfare 
2,156,575,232 
1,191,232 1,810.37 
Economic services 14,982,636,544 32,957,168 454.61 
Debt servicing 4,642,338,816 32,957,168 140.86 
Other purposes 13,723,859,968 32957168 416.42 
Source: Authors‘ own calculations 
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Table 5. The computation of expenditure norms for municipalities (2008 values, in Ph Pesos) 
Expenditure category 
Aggregate 
expenditures 
needs 
(total exps. 2008) 
Estimated 
aggregate 
number of 
clients 
Per client 
expenditure 
norm 
    
General public services  43,324,829,696 55,436,636 781.52 
Education, culture and sports 2,286,163,456 46,164,100 49.52 
Health, nutrition and population 
control 6,438,859,776 16,678,747 386.05 
Labor and employment 69,520,528 28,752,384 2.42 
Housing and community development 983,428,864 18,695,866 52.60 
Social security/social service and 
welfare 2,517,392,896 2,469,623 1,019.34 
Economic services 10,452,777,984 55,436,636 188.55 
Debt servicing 1,476,958,336 55,436,636 26.64 
Other purposes 15,960,967,168 55,436,636 287.91 
Source: Authors‘ own calculations 
 
In Appendix 5, we provide a sample of the data generated to arrive to the expenditure needs of 
each LGU. 
 
Estimation of expenditure needs using Weighted Indexes (EN2) 
An alternative method for the estimation of expenditure needs is to use an adjusted version of the 
weighted index developed in the previous section.
25
 For this purpose, first, it is necessary to get 
an aggregate estimate of expenditure needs for all LGUs in each subgroup. We will call these 
LENp, LENc, LENm, representing respectively the aggregate expenditure needs for the 
provinces (p), cities (c), and municipalities (m). For operational purposes, we are going to 
assume those aggregate expenditure needs are equal to the aggregate executed expenditures in 
the last year in each subgroup. These aggregates can be adjusted in different forms. Historical 
expenditures (of last year) can be adjusted upward to the current year by applying a growth index 
that may include the rate of inflation and possibly some real growth. Also each of the aggregates 
could be adjusted up or down depending on a priori perceptions that some of the aggregates may 
under-represent needs (perhaps the case of municipalities and perhaps also provinces) or over-
represent needs (perhaps the case of cities). In future years, the same approach could be used and 
                                                 
25
 But recall that above the index formula is used to distribute the available funds in the FEEP. Here, the index 
formula is used differently, namely, to compute expenditure needs   
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of course the political factor can and should become more explicit in the setting and reordering 
of expenditure priorities from the top down.  
 
Second, it will be necessary to adjust the index formula used above so that it includes only those 
factors representing expenditure needs. As we pointed out above, the index could be different for 
the different subgroups, thus reflecting differences in expenditure needs. Here we will just use an 
adjusted index that excludes the fiscal capacity factor: 
 
AAIi = λ1(Popi/ΣPopi) + λ2(Areai/ΣAreai) + λ3 (YoungPopi/ΣYoungPopi)   
+ λ4 (OldPopi/ΣOldPopi) + λ5(PovPopi/ΣPovPopi) 
  
This index has the same properties as above and so they will not be repeated here. Table 6 
summarizes the steps involved in estimating expenditure needs with this approach. 
 
Table 6. Computing expenditure needs based on an index formula 
Step 1. Determination of the aggregate level of local expenditure needs (LENp, 
LENc, LENm) 
 
These can be based on the most recent historical data but that data can be 
adjusted in different ways. In the computation we use executed budget data for 
2008, and make no adjustments  
 
Step 2. Selection of expenditure needs factors 
 
The expenditure needs factors selected can differ among subgroups of LGUs : 
Here we will use population, land area, young population, elderly population 
and population living in poverty. 
 
Step 3. Computation of each local unit’s relative need for each factor 
 
The share of population for each local government in the entire population is 
Popi/ΣPopi (and so on.  
 
        
                         Designing the Local Government Enhancement Fund for the Philippines                                        37 
 
Step 4. Determination of the relative importance or weights of each needs factor 
 
The weights are assumed to be λ1 = 0.40 ;  λ2 = 0.15;  λ3  = 0.15; λ4 = 0.15;   
λ5 = 0.15 
Other sets of weights could be assumed and be simulated.   
 
Step 5. Calculation of the expenditure need for locality i as:  
 
Need ip =  AAIip ·  LENp  for provinces   
Need ic =  AAIic ·  LENc  for cities 
Need im =  AAIim ·  LENm  for provinces 
 
  
 
 
A summary of the computation is shown in Table 7 and an example of the data computation to 
arrive at the results is shown in Appendix 6. 
 
Table 7. Per capita expenditure needs using weighted index formula (Descriptive statistics 
for 2008 in PhP) 
 Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Min 567.15 1,991.18 968.02 
Max 1,844.61 6,997.48 107,315.7 
Average 899.68 3,541.45 1,762.22 
Standard deviation 186.90 1,222.11 2,824.68 
Coefficient of variation 0.21 0.35 1.60 
    
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Approaches to estimating fiscal capacity 
 
Below we review two possible approaches to estimate the fiscal capacity of LGUs. Fiscal 
capacity has been defined as the potential revenue that a local government can raise from its tax 
base, exerting an average level of effort. Thus, in order to measure fiscal capacity, it would be 
natural to focus on those revenues sources over which local governments have a certain degree 
of autonomy (i.e. the capacity to modify either the base or the rates applied). These are usually 
referred to as own revenues. Other revenues, such as shared taxes and transfers, of course, 
provide local governments with revenues, but since they cannot be directly affected by local 
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governments, they can be accounted for directly by the amounts actually received by local 
governments for those concepts.   
 
The adequate estimation of local fiscal capacity becomes important because of the ability local 
governments have to affect actual tax collections. As the fiscal gap (and thus the FEEP transfer 
actually received) is expected to be larger with lower fiscal capacity, there may be an incentive 
for government officials to reduce tax effort from their own revenue sources (those over which 
they can exert effective autonomy). In contrast, as just remarked above, those other revenue 
sources not subject to the influence of local government actions, such as shared taxes or other 
transfers, do not present any difficulty in this regard. For revenues outside the control of local 
governments, historical or actual revenues usually represent a good approximation to revenue 
collection capacity. 
 
The problem of estimating fiscal capacity is therefore reduced to the adequate estimation of 
(properly defined) own revenues. Thus we can define over all fiscal capacity as the sum of 
estimated potential own revenues (EORi), and all other shared revenues and transfers received 
(OT) other than the FEEP transfer. The fiscal capacity of a local unit i can then be computed as: 
iii OTEORFC  , 
Unfortunately, there is usually a lack of data on tax bases which limits our ability to properly 
estimate own revenue capacity. Nevertheless there is information on cadastral values for the 
property tax which we will try to use. 
 
Regardless of the methodology used to estimate potential own revenues, overall per capita fiscal 
capacity is obtained, as shown in the formula, by adding up the estimate of own revenues to the 
actual shared revenue shares and all transfers (except for those received from the FEEP.)  
 
In the following discussion we present two methodologies for estimating potential own revenues 
(EORi).  
  
        
                         Designing the Local Government Enhancement Fund for the Philippines                                        39 
 
Estimation of Fiscal Capacity using Average of Past Collection Ratios (FC1) 
In the absence of detailed local data the estimation of fiscal capacity can be based on historical 
information available for local fiscal revenues. In general terms, this methodology can be 
described by the following procedure: 
 
Step 1:   Select the revenue sources and time periods that would help to estimate the ability of 
local governments to collect their own revenues ( iOR ), and for which complete 
information is available. It is useful to use, for example, average data for the last three 
years. The categories considered in the estimation should be those for which local 
government units have some discretion or ability to change effort of collection. So this 
category should include perhaps fully assigned taxes to local units plus all user fees and 
charges. 
 
Step 2: Compute revenues based on the local revenue source j, Fj, for each local unit i and do 
the same at the national level for all local units in the same subgroup. We can define 
 jfromrevenuesocalF ji      as the revenue from source j in each in local unit  i 
               and    jfrominsubgrouprevenuestotalF jN   
as the revenue in the set of all local units in the subgroup from source j. It follows that 
total current own revenues for the local unit i is given by  j jiF  and for the entire 
subgroup of local units by  j jNF . 
 
Stressing a very important issue, the estimation of fiscal capacity should be based on potential 
revenues. As explained, the use of historical or actual fiscal revenues might result in providing 
perverse incentives to local governments. A practical way of facing this problem is to consider 
an average of the relative (with respect to the national level) per capita tax collections for a 
relatively longer period of time (say, three years) as an indicator of local fiscal capacity. The idea 
is in using averages of several periods, it will become more difficult for local units to alter the 
indicator of relative fiscal capacity.  
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Step 3: Compute the index of relative fiscal capacity, IRFCi, for each subgroup of local units 
(Provinces, Cities, and Municipalities) which can be defined as the historical average 
(2008-2010) of  j jNj ji FF , representing the relation between the own revenue of 
local unit i and the one for the entire subgroup. 
 
Step 4: Compute the fiscal capacity for each municipality i in each subgroup as:  
 ii IRFCFC  aggregate forecast of collections for the entire subgroup 
such that FCi can be interpreted as the amount of collections that a local governments 
would have in the projected period. For the purpose of the simulations, we will use the 
aggregate own revenue collections for each subgroup of the last year available as a way 
to define ―aggregate forecast of collections for the entire subgroup.” Note that the 
aggregate forecast of collections for the entire subgroup for future years could be 
obtained by applying a growth index to the base year based on the inflation rate and 
some estimate of real growth for the main tax bases. 
 
Although at the present time the implementation of this methodology is less than ideal, it may be 
a good alternative to estimate potential own revenues and fiscal capacity of LGUs in the short 
term. The data required in this approach are not difficult to generate, and the use of several 
periods provides a simple and effective way to reduce the perverse incentives‘ problem but 
clearly it does not eliminate it. 
 
A sample of the data and procedures followed to estimating the capacity with the average of past 
collection ratios is shown in Appendix 7 while the summary descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 8.  
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Table 8. Per capita fiscal capacity using Average of Past Collection Ratios (Descriptive 
statistics)  
 Provinces  Cities  Municipalities  
    
Min 431.87 1,434.61 441.95 
Max 11,126.72 15,526.94 269,194.9 
Average 1,357.81 3,464.35 2,288.65 
Standard deviation 1,295.27 1,582.38 7,105.55 
Coeff. of variation 0.95 0.46 3.10 
    
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Estimation of Fiscal Capacity using Basic Proxies (FC2) 
Another methodology that can be used to calculate local fiscal capacity is to employ a proxy (or 
proxies) that are highly correlated with a local unit‘s own capacity to collect revenues. Ideally, 
one would use some measure of gross local product or per capita income, but lacking those data 
we propose to use property value assessments as a proxy for the entire own revenue capacity 
(and not just property taxes). This may be less than ideal because a good proxy requires that local 
government units do not have any capacity to modify the values the proxy takes.  
 
The logic behind using property value assessments lies in that first it is the variable available that 
is close to some measure of tax bases and second, that is not unreasonable to think that if 
assessed values are high other tax bases in the local governments are also likely to be high. That 
is, we would anticipate that property value assessments are highly correlated with other local tax 
bases. Unfortunately, we only have property value assessments for provinces and cities, but not 
for municipalities. Therefore, this measure of fiscal capacity ‗FC2‘ is only calculated for 
provinces and cities.   
 
The basic regressions of local own revenues on property value assessments are shown in Table 9. 
The relative high values of the R-square indicate a good fit and high explanatory power of the 
chosen proxy. The summary statistics for the estimated fiscal capacity are shown in Table 10. 
Cities on average, and as expected, have higher per capita fiscal capacity, more than double the 
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per capita capacity of provinces. The variation in the estimates is quite lager in the case of the 
provinces as measured by the coefficient of variation.   
 
Table 9. Property value assessments as a Proxy Variable for Local Own Revenues 
 Province  City  Municipality  
 Coefficients t - Stat Coefficients t - Stat Coefficients t - Stat 
Constant 4.69e+07 4.28 1.50e+07 0.40 - - 
Property Tax 
Assess 
coefficient  
.007 13.73 
 
0.042 
 
31.25 
 
- 
 
- 
R-square 0.71  0.88  - - 
F-Statistic 188.38  976.47  - - 
 
Source: Department of Finance and own calculations. 
 
Table 10. Per capita fiscal capacity using basic proxies (Descriptive statistics for 2008 in 
PhP)  
 
 
 
Provinces Cities Municipalities 
    
Min 433.12 1,416.93 - 
Max 10,759.2 12,544.29 - 
Average 1,346.35 3,512.88 - 
Standard deviation 1,255.44 1,575.95 - 
Coeff. of variation 0.93 0.45 - 
    
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Coming up with the Fiscal Gap for LGUs  
 
The two last sub-sections have dealt with the methodologies for estimating, separately, 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity for each LGU. In this section we look at the possible 
combinations of those measures in order to compute the fiscal gap for LGUs. 
 
From the combination of the alternative methodologies described above, we can derive up to 
four measurements of fiscal gaps for the three groups of LGUs. Naturally, each measurement 
would lead to a different distribution of the FEEP funds across the LGUs. The four alternatives 
are presented in the following chart: 
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  Fiscal Capacity Measurement 
 
 
Average of Past 
Collection Ratios 
(FC1) 
Basic Proxy 
 
(FC2) 
Expenditure 
Needs 
Measurement 
Per Client Expenditure Norms 
(EN1) 
Fiscal Gap  
Measure 1 
Fiscal Gap  
Measure 2 
Weighted Indexes 
(EN2) 
Fiscal Gap  
Measure 3 
Fiscal Gap  
Measure 4 
 
Thus, for instance, Fiscal Gap Measure 3 is based on the estimation of expenditure needs 
according to the weighted indexes‘ methodology (EN2) and the estimated value of local fiscal 
capacity obtained by using the average of past collection ratios (FC1), such that the fiscal gap be 
defined as:  
 
FG3 = EN2 – FC1.  
 
Naturally, different measures of fiscal gaps will be obtained from different combinations, and a 
discussion ensues as to which of the available alternatives make more sense to be used in the 
distribution of the FEEP in the short to medium term. In Tables 11 to 13 we present descriptive 
statistics for the four alternative measures and to make them more comparable we express them 
in per capita terms.  
 
It needs to be clear that no measure of fiscal gap can be said to be superior to another based only 
on these statistics, but it is important to have a notion about the distribution of per capita fiscal 
gaps in order to evaluate and compare the performance of the alternative methodologies. In truth, 
what matters is the quality of the estimations of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. The more 
accurate those estimations are, then the more reliable will be the estimation of per capita fiscal 
disparities. 
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Table 11. Fiscal Gaps for Provinces (Descriptive statistics) 
(2008 values, in PHP) 
 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 1 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 2 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 3 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 4 
     
Min -3,141.47 -3,314.35 -2,685.70 -2,858.58 
Max 375.06 373.81 359.97 358.72 
Range (max - min) 3,516.53 3,688.16 3,045.67 3,217.30 
     
Average -413.12 -398.38 -332.89 -318.15 
Standard deviation 668.93 669.26 556.39 557.41 
     
Average of positive fiscal disparities 106.15 111.51 126.22 109.86 
Number of localities with positive FD 21 19 16 20 
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
Table 12. Fiscal Gaps for Cities  (Descriptive statistics) 
(2008 values, in PhP) 
 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 1 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 2 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 3 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 4 
     
Min -12,754.2 -9,771.62 -13,503.8 -10,521.2 
Max 1,394.33 1,477.18 2,986.23 2,940.93 
Range (max - min) 14,148.59 11,248.80 16,490.09 13,462.14 
     
Average -517.18 -559.21 86.41 27.18 
Standard deviation 1,599.82 1,577.06 1,943.91 1,871.69 
     
Average of positive fiscal disparities 467.71 488.73 988.12 956.84 
Number of localities with positive FD 55 54 90 85 
Source: Own calculations 
 
From Tables 11 to 13 it is important to note that the results from the four proposals are mostly 
consistent in terms of the determination of local units with positive fiscal disparities (i.e. 
expenditure needs greater than fiscal capacities); perhaps the exception is for the case of cities.  
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Table 13. Fiscal Gaps for Municipalities   (Descriptive statistics) 
(2008 values, in PhP) 
 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 1 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 2 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 3 
Fiscal Gap 
Measure 4 
     
Min -26,7796.6 - -16,1879.3 - 
Max 1,042.23 - 1,176.10 - 
Range (max - min) 26,8838.8 - 16,3055.4 - 
     
Average -776.57 - -530.03 - 
Standard deviation 7146.20 - 4372.80 - 
     
Average of positive fiscal disparities 205.23 - 193.91 - 
Number of localities with positive FD 467 - 493 - 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Following the discussion presented throughout this report, one of the two most important goals 
of the FEEP will be to reduce the differences in fiscal disparities (or fiscal gaps) across LGUs. In 
practical terms, this requires reducing to a greater extent the largest local fiscal disparities.  
 
Any measurement of (per capita) fiscal gap provides a natural criterion for the assignment of 
FEEP funds. Those local units with negative fiscal gaps (with fiscal capacity exceeding their 
expenditure needs) do not require, in principle, funds from the FEEP program. At the same time, 
those localities with larger (positive) fiscal gaps should receive greater (per capita) transfers than 
others with smaller fiscal disparities. These are widely accepted principles. However, how big a 
per capital fiscal gap should be in order to define a local unit as beneficiary and how much more 
FEEP funds should be given to a relatively ―needy‖ jurisdiction are open questions which cannot 
receive definite answers. Below, we implement one of several alternative approaches to 
apportioning the available FEEP funds among local units with positive fiscal disparities, which 
we can label the proportional allocation mechanism. This approach apportions the available 
transfer funds among local units as a fixed proportion of their (positive) fiscal disparities within 
each subgroup of LGUs. No matter what the size of fiscal disparity is, all local units with a 
positive fiscal gap will receive a transfer from the FEEP, and the size of the transfer will depend 
on the percentage of total positive disparities represented by that local unit and, of course, on the 
size of the FEEP funds to be transferred.  
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This latter point brings us back to the issue of the vertical distribution of the FEEP funds across 
the different subgroups. Here we will make two sets of assumptions for actually implementing 
the FEEP distributions. In the first case, we repeat the vertical distribution assumed in the 
subsection above ―Simpler approach--Expanding the weighted index formula in the IRA‖ and 
assign 28.75 percent of the available FEEP funds to the provinces,   28.75 percent to the cities, 
and 42.50 percent to the municipalities.  
 
In the second approach, we apportion the FEEP funds proportionally to the total (positive) fiscal 
gaps for each subgroup of LGUs. In order to arrive at these proportions we add all the (positive) 
fiscal gaps across the three subgroups of LGUs and then derive the proportion for each. As we 
have discussed above, this approach is far from ideal because our estimations of fiscal gaps is 
conditional on the current systems of intergovernmental finance, including the IRA. In the future, 
it will be possible to arrive at measures of fiscal gap that are based on normative statements of 
expenditure needs of the different LGUs. That would provide a better justification for the vertical 
apportionment of the FEEP funds based on the proportional size of aggregate fiscal gaps for the 
different subgroups of LGUs.    
 
The results from implementing the ―Proportional Allocation Mechanism‖ for FEEP Funds: 
 
In order to apportion the available FEEP funds for the three subgroups of LGUs we first compute 
the relative fiscal gaps for provinces, cities, municipalities following the steps described above.
26
 
The results for the relative fiscal gaps, which, recall, only apply to those LGUs with positive 
fiscal gaps, are shown in Tables 14 to 16, for provinces, cities and municipalities, respectively.. 
Examples of the steps followed for these computations are shown in Appendix 8.  
  
                                                 
26
 See the section ―Distributing the FEEP funds on the basis of estimated fiscal gaps of LGUs” above in this 
paper. 
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Table 14. Relative Fiscal Gaps for Provinces (Descriptive statistics) 
 
 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 1 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 2 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 3 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 4 
     
Min 0.0006 0.0015 0.0067 0.0027 
Max 0.1683 0.1764 0.1782 0.1633 
Range (max - min) 0.1677 0.1749 0.1716 0.1605 
     
Average 0.048 0.053 0.063 0.050 
Standard deviation 0.043 0.045 0.043 0.039 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 15. Relative Fiscal Gaps for Cities (Descriptive statistics) 
 
 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 1 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 2 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 3 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 4 
     
Min 0.0004 0.0002 0.0012 0.0001 
Max 0.0542 0.0560 0.0336 0.0362 
Range (max - min) 0.0538 0.0558 0.0323 0.0360 
     
Average 0.0182 0.0185 0.0111 0.0118 
Standard deviation 0.0143 0.0128 0.0070 0.0076 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 16.  Relative Fiscal Gaps for Municipalities (Descriptive statistics) 
 
 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 1 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 2 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 3 
Relative Fiscal 
Gap Measure 4 
     
Min 6.27E-07 - 3.84E-06 - 
Max 0.010875 - 0.012303 - 
Range (max - min) 0.010874 - 0.012299 - 
 
 
   
Average 0.002141 - 0.002028 - 
Standard deviation 0.001568 - 0.001541 - 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 17 provides the summary descriptive statistics for the allocation of FEEP transfers 
assigned using the fiscal gap measure 1 (FG1) (i.e. with per-client expenditure norms for 
measuring expenditure needs (EN1) and the average of past collection ratios for measuring fiscal 
capacity (FC1), also using the proportional allocation mechanism for the apportionment of the 
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funds, and using the vertical distribution assumed in the subsection above ―Simpler approach--
Expanding the weighted index formula in the IRA‖ by  assigning 28.75 percent of the available 
FEEP funds to the provinces,  28.75 percent to the cities, and 42.50 percent to the municipalities.  
 
Table 17.  Per capita FEEP Transfers under Proportional Allocation and Adjusted IRA 
Vertical Distribution Rule  
(for 2008 in PhP) 
 Provinces Cities Municipalities 
    
Min 0 0 0 
Max 2031.23 4445.48 9068.76 
Average 126.42 576.52 315.71 
Standard deviation 326.42 1016.61 669.30 
Coeff. of variation 2.58 1.76 2.12 
Total FEEP transfers 
(in million PhP) 
15,376.74 15,376.74 22,730.83 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
Next, we perform an alternative allocation of the FEEP transfers by using the same set of 
assumptions except for the vertical distribution of the funds among provinces, cities, and 
municipalities. Here we apportion the FEEP funds proportionally to the total (positive) fiscal 
gaps for each subgroup of LGUs. Thus, first we compute the proportions or shares in the total for 
positive fiscal gaps across the three groups of LGUs.  The allocation of FEEP transfers that 
would follow if we were to use this vertical distribution rule would be quite different from those 
in Table 17. As shown in Table 18, for the summary statistics of this distribution, the clear 
winners, vis-à-vis the results in Table 17, would be the municipalities. Both provinces and cities 
would be relative losers, and more so for the provinces.   
 
The horizontal distribution rule applied in both Tables 17 and 18 is an example of how this 
allocation can be done. As we have seen, there are other possibilities for the horizontal allocation 
and they are all legitimate. Improving on the horizontal allocation rule will be conditioned by the 
improvements of the available data so that more sophisticated methodologies can be used to 
capture expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. 
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Table 18.  Per capita FEEP Transfers under Proportional Allocation and Share of 
Aggregate Fiscal Gap Vertical Distribution Rule  
(for 2008 in PhP) 
 Provinces Cities Municipalities 
    
Min 0 0 0 
Max 127.17 3,213.12 16,520.08 
Average 7.92 416.70 575.12 
Standard deviation 20.44 734.79 1,219.23 
Coeff. of variation 2.58 1.76 2.12 
Total FEEP transfers 
(in million PhP) 
9,627.18 11,114.03 41,407.54 
Source: Own Calculations. 
 
On the other hand, fundamentally, there are no very strong reasons supporting either modality of 
vertical allocation of the FEEP funds among the three subgroups of LGUs respectively used in 
Table 17 and Table 19. Their advantage is that they offer a rationale for the vertical distribution 
as opposed to some rule that is arbitrarily derived. However, as we have argued above in the 
paper, we could arrive at a strong vertical allocation rule if we were to use normatively derived 
expenditure norms in the computation of expenditure needs for all LGUs. This would also 
improve the horizontal distribution of the funds within each subgroup of LGUs. But as we have 
already indicated, this paper cannot make those adjustments. They only can be done by the 
Government of the Philippines.     
 
To close this section we examine some of the dimensions of the equalization impact of 
distributing the FEEP funds using a fiscal gap approach. 
 
First we must note again that not all LGUs receive transfers funds under this approach. As we 
find in Tables 11 to 13 above, only a share of provinces, cities and municipalities end up with a 
positive fiscal gap and would therefore be entitled to receiving FEEP funds. Based on the total 
numbers for the different subgroups of LGUs,
27
  our simulations show that only between 20 and 
                                                 
27
 The percentages that follow are based on totals of 78 provinces, 136 cities, and 1,492 municipalities.  
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27 percent of the provinces would receive FEEP funds, between 40 and 61 percent of cities, and 
between 31 and 33 percent of municipalities. 
28
 
 
Table 19.  Coefficient of Variation of the Per Capita Incomes Available Before and After 
FEEP 
 Provinces Cities Municipalities 
Before FEEP 0.936 0.445 3.108 
After FEEP 1 0.510 0.383 2.714 
After FEEP 2 0.471 0.356 2.733 
After FEEP 3 0.542 0.360 2.497 
Note: FFEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution formula and adjusted 
IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and adjusted IRA 
vertical distribution rule; FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and share of aggregate 
fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.  
 
Second, the impact of the FEEP distribution is equalizing as can be seen in Table 19 by the 
significant reductions in the coefficient of variation for per capita income available before and 
after the distribution of the FEEP within the provinces, cities, and municipalities.   
 
Third, the amounts per capita distributed with the FEP are not at all trivial if we compare them 
side by side with the amounts per capita received from the IRA; actually in many cases they can 
be much higher. In Tables 20 to 22 we show the per capita amounts received from the IRA and 
from the FEEP for the ten largest winners (in per capita FEEP amounts) for the provinces, cities 
and municipalities.  
 
  
                                                 
28
 It needs to be recalled that not all cities are well-off and that the computed fiscal gap is still a relative concept 
based on historical data. Because there are few cities that are very rich that is likely to pull a large number of other 
cities into having a positive fiscal gap. A lot of these numbers could change in the future once absolute measures of  
expenditure needs are derived.    
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Table 20.  Per Capita IRA and FEEP for the Ten Largest Winners from the FEEP (based 
on the fiscal gap 1): Provinces 
Region Province IRA FEEP 1 FEEP 2 FEEP 3 
Region XII Maguindanao 412.634 204.548 2031.225 127.172 
Region III Nueva Ecija 491.088 190.542 941.812 58.966 
Region III Pampanga 473.961 158.447 784.321 49.105 
Region V Camarines Sur 590.530 214.251 843.024 52.781 
Region I Pangasinan 492.485 172.967 482.037 30.180 
Region IX Sulu 633.692 210.077 1305.255 81.720 
Region VI Iloilo 577.965 197.140 513.449 32.146 
Region IV-A Rizal 432.889 144.583 363.529 22.760 
Region VII Bohol 671.935 228.898 556.333 34.831 
Region VI 
Negros 
Occidental 
593.041 187.058 279.647 17.508 
Note: Year 2008 data. FFEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution 
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation 
and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and 
share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21.  Per Capita IRA and FEEP for the Ten Largest Winners from the FEEP (based 
on the fiscal gap 1): Cities 
Region City IRA FEEP 1 FEEP 2 FEEP 3 
Region XII Cotabato City 1333.994  543.052  3216.155  2324.581  
Region III San Jose del Monte City 1013.657  366.653  1893.676  1368.716  
Region XII Marawi City 1372.108  544.568  4376.881  3163.533  
Region XII General Santos City 1251.368  396.923  1103.752  797.773  
Region IV-A Antipolo City 1048.766  332.166  906.155  654.953  
Region I San Carlos City 1702.440  609.463  3524.536  2547.473  
Region VII Talisay City (Cebu) 1260.918  471.279  3083.100  2228.411  
Region V Tabaco City 1774.952  645.854  4445.481  3213.116  
Region III Malolos City 1234.820  439.594  2392.208  1729.046  
Region IX Zamboanga City 1493.793  440.437  681.666  492.697  
Note: Year 2008 data. FFEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution 
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation 
and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and 
share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.  
 
 
 
  
52                                               International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
 
Table 22.  Per Capita IRA and FEEP for the Ten Largest Winners from the FEEP (based 
on the fiscal gap 1): Municipalities 
Region Province Municipality IRA FEEP 1 FEEP 2 FEEP 3 
Region IX Tawi-Tawi Balimbing 439.561 403.718 4894.385 8915.842 
Region IX Basilan Maluso 745.383 351.985 3496.870 6370.063 
Region XII Maguindanao Datu Odin Sinsuat  654.487 328.303 1533.682 2793.828 
Region VII Cebu Barili 745.354 361.131 2604.800 4745.025 
Region IX Sulu Jolo 747.425 272.250 1116.778 2034.376 
Region XII Lanao Del Sur Piagapo 850.203 459.664 4373.018 7966.094 
Region XII Maguindanao Matanog 848.958 419.647 4149.793 7559.458 
Region IX Sulu Indanan 860.292 312.326 1712.173 3118.974 
Region XII Maguindanao Parang 731.079 338.620 1383.433 2520.127 
Region XII Maguindanao Talayan 870.496 441.588 5355.485 9755.804 
Note: Year 2008 data. FFEP 1 represents FEEP transfers under adjusted weighted index horizontal distribution 
formula and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 2 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation 
and adjusted IRA vertical distribution rule; FEEP 3 represents FEEP transfers under proportional allocation and 
share of aggregate fiscal gap vertical distribution rule.  
 
V. Performance-based evaluation of recipient LGUs  
 
A key element in the design of the FEEP will be to ensure that these additional funds will be 
used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. There are essentially two different 
approaches that can be used with the end of monitoring and improving the performance of 
LGUs. The first is a traditional approach using ex-ante controls and conditions on how the LUGs 
can deploy the additional funds. These include regulations for how the funds may be spent, what 
kind of inputs can be used, pre-approval of local decisions by higher authorities, and so on. The 
trend in budgeting policy and practice worldwide has been toward deemphasizing or plainly 
abandoning this approach. The second option is to focus on the performance of LGUs by 
examining ex-post what they have been able to achieve in what ultimately matters, visible 
quantifiable improvements in the quality and quantity of public services for which they are 
responsible. This new trend merges perfectly well with the emphasis at the national level on 
performance-based budgeting and medium-term budgeting frameworks. However, there are 
significant difficulties in implement this second approach. In the real world, it tends to be 
simpler and easier to measure inputs than to measure outputs. In particular, the measurement of 
the quality and quantity of many public services can be quite challenging. But significant 
advances have been made in this area, and therefore, despite the challenges, it would seem that 
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using ex-post performance-based evaluation would be the best direction to go to ensure the more 
efficient use of FEEP funds.  
 
Although they are not uncommon, the experience worldwide with performance-based grants is 
not yet large. Bergvall et al. (2006) review some of the European experience with this type of 
grants and Shah (2009) reviews the experiences of other developed and developing countries. 
Actually some of the performance-based grants in other countries are quite recent, such as 
Australia‘s ―National Schools Specific Purpose Payments‘ and the U.S. ―Race to the Top 
Competitive Grant Program.‖ Among developing countries, Brazil has implemented 
performance-based grants for education and health. Other countries, including Argentina, Chile 
and Indonesia have implemented this type of grants for a variety of service, including roads, 
water, or even social insurance.    
 
In general, there are different implementation paths that can be followed. Two important 
objectives would be to preserve a high degree of autonomy of LGUs and to give them enough 
time to adjust and ratchet up their performance. This latter will be important because many of the 
recipient LGUs will be relatively poorer ones with lower administrative capacity. 
 
What is proposed here is to provide LGUs a period of time (for example, 3 years)
29
 after 
receiving the additional funds to show proof of improved performance in a number of carefully 
selected indicators. In the case of unsatisfactory performance a probationary period of 3 more 
years but with reduced funding from the FEEP of 50 percent would be granted. In the case of 
failure again after the probationary period the FEEP allocation would be terminated for say a 
period of 3 additional years. After that a new cycle could be started for qualifying LGUs under 
the FEEP horizontal distribution rules. Of course, these are suggestive periods and rules and will 
be subject to modification and improvements through a dialog with stakeholders, especially the 
associations of LGUs. 
 
                                                 
29
 The selection of the time period may not be a simple matter since the typical terms of local officials is 3 years, so 
it is not clear that the right incentives would be in place.  
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A big challenge will lie in the selection of the performance indicators. The indicators at a 
minimum should meet these characteristics or properties. They need to be measured 
independently from the LGUs themselves; that is, they cannot be self-reported to avoid moral 
hazard problems. Ideally, the measurements will be provided by an independent agency which is 
accepted with respect and credibility by all stakeholders. The indicators also need to be 
‗meaningful‘; that is to matter in a significant way for quality and quantity of public services and 
ultimately for the quality of life of the residents in each LGU.  
 
An additional challenge is that whatever indicators are selected, the different LGUs are likely to 
start in terms of those indicators at different points. This means that if the indicator levels are 
chosen to be low, many LGUs would just automatically qualify, which would produce no 
inducement to increase performance. A potential solution to this dilemma may be to focus on 
differentiated changes in those indicators as opposed to the levels per se of the indicators. But 
this choice will not be free of problems because the relative difficulty of achieving advances in 
the different indicators is not likely to be independent of the level of the indicator itself; for 
example, improvements may be easier to achieve at relatively low levels of the indicator. This is 
an area that will require ample discussion and consensus reaching with stakeholders.   
 
One first choice of performance criteria is whether they should concentrate exclusively on the 
expenditure-service side of the budget or could also include criteria from the revenue side of the 
budget. 
 
There are good arguments to include the revenue side of the budget as part of the performance 
indicators. Many observers of the decentralization process in the Philippines have highlighted the 
low level and declining trend in own revenue collections by LGUs  A possible performance 
criterion would involve certain percent increases in the collection of  property taxes, or perhaps 
all own revenues.  
 
However, it is clear that the bulk of the performance criteria would come from the expenditure-
service side of the budget. An important decision will be whether to focus on the outputs of 
services or else on the outcomes. In general, the indicators should preferably be service outputs, 
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as opposed to outcomes, given the local jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service 
outcomes. For example, local jurisdictions can do much more to ensure high rates of vaccination 
or enrollments rates for children. They are less able to control the overall health of children or 
their overall level of intellectual achievement since these outcomes depend on many other 
variables, including the income and level of education of parents, which are outside the control 
of the local governments.     The property of ―meaningfulness‖ could be met if the performance 
indicators were to focus at least in part on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in the 
areas of health, education and poverty reduction. Possible candidates for performance 
measurement could include: the percent change in infant mortality rate, the percent change in 
enrollment rates, and percent change in access to potable water. But as simple as these indicators 
may look, there would still be formidable difficulties in getting them implemented.  
 
In the first place, even though they are all meaningful and desirable outcomes, they may not be 
well under the control or doings of LGUs since there are other influencing factors out of the 
control of LGUs. For example, enrollment rates may depend on agricultural production cycles 
and related family demands. Thus some thought needs to be given to the selection of those types 
of outcomes as indicators vis-à-vis intermediate outputs, which will be more under the control of 
LGUs, for example, the percent of doctor-assisted births. In the second place, even when the 
outcome indicators are thought to be the right ones, the challenge will be to measure them in an 
objective and consistent basis. All this means that considerable further thought and discussions 
will need to be put into arriving at the FEEP performance indicators.     
 
So there will be important challenges ahead in selecting the appropriate performance indicators. 
Fortunately, solid foundation work has been already done in the Philippines in the area of LGU 
performance measurement, as for example by Sosmeña et al. (2004) and Guillermo (2008). The 
Department of Interior and Local Governments (DILG) has developed its own Local 
Government Performance Measurement System (LGPMS) which also provides a good starting 
point for the selection of the proper performance indicators.
30
   
 
  
                                                 
30
 See also the background report from the Department of Finance (2008).  
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VI. Summary and conclusions  
 
The main transfer instrument from the central governments to local government units (LGUs) in 
the Philippines, the IRA (Internal Revenue Allotment), introduced in 2001, has been criticized 
for two main failings: its inability to equalize sufficiently, especially regarding the poorer 
municipalities and provinces, and that its funds have not been spent in an efficient manner. 
Recently LGU associations have petitioned the Government of the Philippines (GoP) for an 
expansion in the funding of the IRA from 40 percent of internal revenue collections to 50 
percent, and several draft Bills have been prepared. There appears to be ample consensus that if 
the additional 10 percent in funding were to take place, these funds should not be distributed 
following the same methodology used for the IRA. Two general requirements are often 
mentioned: that the additional funds would need to have a much stronger equalization effect 
among LGUs, and that the recipient LGUs use the funds to improve the performance of public 
services.  
 
The design of the new transfer -- the fund for ―Fiscal Equity and Expenditure Performance‖ or 
FEEP-- for 10 percent additional funding as separate from the IRA will face four major 
challenges: (1) How to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10 percent additional 
funding (2) How to apportion the additional funding among the different groups of LGUs 
(provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays) (3) What formula to use for the distribution of 
the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group of LGUs (4) How to ensure 
that the additional funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance  
These four challenges are addressed in this paper.  
 
Regarding how to concretely define the origin and computation of the 10 percent additional 
funding, we have explored two basic options: Using the same base as for the IRA, which is 
internal revenue collection, or using the broader base of total national revenues, which expands 
the IRA base to include all the collections also realized by the Customs Office. Obviously, the 10 
percent equivalent increase in funding would be the same under both options. The only 
difference is how the two bases perform in the future, in particular from the viewpoint of their 
volatility. We find that although there is some evidence that the broader base exhibits a bit more 
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volatility over time, the differences are not too significant. Therefore, there is not a clear 
preference for either of the two bases for the FEEP.  
  
Perhaps the greatest challenge in designing the FEEP is how to apportion the additional funding 
among the different groups of LGUs (provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays). In the 
paper we explore several possibilities. One of the options considered is a modified IRA 
apportionment by excluding the Barangays from the vertical distribution. We also consider a 
second option with the vertical distribution among provinces, cities and municipalities being 
proportional to their respective aggregate positive fiscal gaps, where those fiscal gaps are 
estimated in this paper. The advantage of either approach is that they offer a rationale for the 
vertical distribution as opposed to some new rule that is again arbitrarily derived. Fundamentally 
the only sound approach to the derivation of the vertical distribution rule is to institute it in 
accordance with the true expenditure needs of the different subgroups of LGUs. The expenditure 
needs derived in this paper are based on recent budget data and of course they do not necessarily 
coincide with what is considered to be the ‗true‘ expenditures needs. That is, the expenditure 
needs we derive in the paper reflect the actual expenditures of different LGUs. If, for example, 
cities receive proportionally much more funds than municipalities, the budgetary data and 
therefore the computed expenditure needs will reflect higher expenditure needs for cities when 
this actually may not be the case from a normative stand. In the paper we argue that we can 
arrive at a strong vertical allocation rule if we were to use normatively derived expenditure 
norms in the computation of expenditure needs for all LGUs. But as we also indicate, this paper 
cannot make the normative decisions necessary for the true expenditure needs. This only can be 
done by the Government of the Philippines.     
 
The main body of the paper addresses the question of what formula to use for the distribution of 
the additional funds for qualifying LGUs in each particular group. Here there seems to be clear 
the consensus on the need to improve the current formula used for the IRA distributions and 
based on a weighted index of population, land area, and equal shares. In the paper we develop 
two alternative approaches. First we improve and expand the weighted index approach now used 
in the IRA by introducing additional factors to better proxy the difference in expenditures needs. 
These factors include the young and elderly populations and the incidence of poverty. We also 
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introduce an additional factor accounting for the differences in fiscal capacity across LGUs. The 
second approach consists in the estimation of a fiscal gap, defined as the difference between 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity, for each LGU. The paper reviews the different 
methodologies available for the estimation of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity and it 
implements with data for 2008 two measures for the estimation of expenditures needs and also 
two measures for the estimation of fiscal capacity. The simulations of the FEEP transfers are 
carried out with the different methodologies assuming two different vertical allocation rules 
(across subgroups of LGUs). The first is a modified IRA allocation rule (excluding Barangays) 
and the second is in proportion to the aggregate positive fiscal gaps in each subgroup of LGUs 
(provinces, cities and municipalities). Using the fiscal gap approach allows restriction of FEEP 
transfers only to those LGUs that have a positive fiscal gap (that is, where expenditure needs 
exceed fiscal capacity). Under the (expanded) weighted index approach all LGUs receive FEEP 
transfers.      
 
The last section of the paper addresses the issue of how to make sure that the additional FEEP 
funds will be used by LGUs to improve their service delivery performance. As opposed to using 
ex-ante conditionality for receiving the additional funds, the paper proposes to use ex-post 
performance indicators. This approach preserves a higher degree of autonomy of LGUs.  The 
carefully selected performance indicators would need to be measured independently from the 
LGUs themselves and should be meaningful in mattering in a significant way in the quality of 
life of LGU residents. The indicators should preferably be service outputs, as opposed to 
outcomes, given the local jurisdictions tend to have much less control for service outcomes. 
Because of very different starting points in most indicators for different LGUs, performance 
would need to be read as differentiated changes in the selected indicators. Failure to deliver 
improved performance in the set period, say after 3 years, would be followed by suspension of 
half of the available funding. After another round or period of performance, for example three 
more years, the funding could be completely suspended, with continued failure to improve, or 
fully restored, with increased performance. Although the paper explores the past experience in 
the Philippines with performance indicators and the several possibilities there may be available, 
the actual selection of the performance indicators will require further work in the future.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1. The Basic Rationale and Measurement of Weights for Expenditure Need Factors 
  
There are two main ways to approach the measurement of expenditure needs factors: the number 
of clients and the cost of standard local service provision.  
 
The number of clients can be used when the cost of the public service varies directly with the 
number of users. In particular, when the per unit cost of the public service is the same across 
jurisdictions and does not change with the number of users, a direct application of this approach 
would be the best option to estimate expenditure needs.  
 
If an expenditure need factor captures the number of consumers for a particular local service, 
then the natural choice for the weight assigned to this factor would be the percent of aggregate 
local expenditures accounted for expenditures on this particular service. For instance, if 
education is 43 percent of the aggregate local budget, one may wish to assign the factor ―school-
aged children‖ a weight of 0.43 in the expenditure needs formula.  
 
It is, however, very common to observe differences in the costs of inputs across jurisdictions, as 
well as changes in production costs as the number of local public services is increased, specially 
due to economies of scale. In such cases, it would be desirable to identify the factors determining 
these cost differentials. These estimations can serve for developing a weighted factor formula or 
for adjusting the per client cost of local service delivery. Unfortunately, no data of cost 
difference are readily available in the Philippines. 
 
Nevertheless, in those cases for which factors attempt to capture the costs of producing local 
services rather than number of consumers, the assignment of weights would require a somewhat 
different type of reasoning. In general, arriving at particular weight factors in a scientific 
objective way is a very difficult task. One possibility is to take actual expenditures by local 
government in a base year as a measure of their expenditure needs (the dependent variable), and 
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then to run a regression on those factors considered as relevant in determining cost differentials 
across jurisdictions.  
 
In order to estimate an ―expenditure need‖ equation we would need to redefine the variables in 
the same scale (a standard normal transformation could be a good alternative) and to force the 
intercept of the regression to be zero. Once all variables are defined in an identical scale, the 
coefficients of the regression would provide a measure of the relative effect that, in average, each 
factor has on the dependent variable. Of course, it is not guaranteed that the coefficients so 
obtained would add up to 1, and thus a correction should be made in order to achieve this 
condition. Another possibility would be to estimate the equation imposing that linear restriction 
on the estimated coefficients. At any rate, the estimated coefficient would then represent the 
weights by which the factors should enter in the index formula to approximate expenditure 
needs. 
 
Appendix 2. Alternative Approaches to Measuring Expenditure Needs
31
 
 
The expenditure needs of a jurisdiction may be defined as the funding necessary to cover all 
expenditure responsibilities assigned to the sub-national government at a standard level of 
service provision. In practice, there are several options to measure differences in expenditure 
needs across sub-national governments. In the following discussion we will describe six 
methodologies, which are presented in order of complexity from the simplest to the most 
complex one. 
 
1.  Lagged expenditure values 
An uncomplicated way to define the expenditure needs of a locality is relying on historical 
expenditure patterns. Specifically, the available information on expenditure data of the last 
year(s) –adjusted by inflation– could be assumed to represent the expenditures needs for each 
jurisdiction. If local government have a great deal of discretion in deciding the amount spent 
during a period, this method offers a reasonably realistic estimation of expenditure needs, with 
important advantages like simplicity and minimum information requirements. Unfortunately, 
                                                 
31
 See Gomez et a. (2007) and Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007). 
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under discretion, and particularly if local governments have access to the financial markets, the 
use of historical data could also provide perverse incentives to the local authorities, because they 
will eventually ―learn‖ that increasing expenditures in the present will result in higher 
equalization transfers in the future. 
 
On the other hand, in the absence of discretion the actual expenditures of past periods could be 
determined by the particular financial constraints of the localities, which are imposed either by 
the central government or by the inability to raise revenues locally. In such rather common cases, 
the historical expenditure patterns would reflect undesired differences in revenue-rising ability 
instead of expenditure needs, and thus they should not be used to estimate the expenditure needs. 
 
As a conclusion, to rely directly on lagged expenditure patterns is not a recommendable way to 
estimate expenditure needs under equalization transfer purposes. 
 
2.  Equal per capita expenditure norm 
The simplest way to estimate the per capita expenditure needs is by taking the average of 
historical expenditures per capita at a national level. In order to compute this average, it is fist 
necessary to determine the aggregate level of sub-national expenditures needs (SEN), which can 
be based on adjusted historical data or on the budget forecast, and then to divide this amount by 
the national population. This simple procedure results advantageous when there is no detailed 
information about the differences in the per capita needs or cost of provision of local public 
services across jurisdictions or when there are reasons to believe that those differences are 
negligible. 
 
The per capita expenditure need will constitute a national norm in this case, and in order to 
compute the expenditure needs for each locality it will only be necessary to multiply this norm 
by the local population: 
 
i
N
i P
P
SEN
EN   
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Indeed, the local population is likely the most important variable determining the total 
expenditure needs and the cost of public service provision for a local government, because it 
directly provides an order of magnitude for the total amount of expenditures that must be 
incurred. Of course, economies of scale, economies of agglomeration, demographic 
characteristics of the population, geographical differences of jurisdictions and other factors can 
substantially modify the applicability of the national average for each and every jurisdiction. In 
that case, the national norm could eventually be adjusted by one or more indexes containing 
information about differences in relative needs or costs of provision. If the index is a good 
approximation to the relative needs and costs of local governments this would clearly be an 
improvement. In any case, it is always necessary to take into account the higher complexity that 
comes with the gain in accuracy.  
 
3.  Per client (top-down) financial expenditure norms 
This methodology follows a similar structure than the ―equal per capita expenditure norm‖ 
methodology, but improves the estimation of the expenditures needs by using more detailed 
information about the expenditure functions assigned to the local governments, and devising a 
local government functional allocation in a ―top-down‖ manner.  Its procedure can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Step 1: To determine the aggregate level of sub-national expenditures needs (SEN) and the 
aggregate level of expenditures needs per function j of sub-national governments 
(SENj). 
 
As mentioned before, the SEN can be based on adjusted historical data or on the budget forecast. 
The same is true for functional expenditures needs, which must refer to the expenditure 
responsibilities assigned by law to the local governments. Alternatively, the functional budget 
forecast can incorporate adjustments responding to changes in expenditure priorities, but of 
course in the overall the adjustments must balance in order to fit the SEN.  
 
Step 2: To compute the per client expenditure norm for each function j, dividing SENj by the 
number of clients or users that the function j has at a national level, Cj. 
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For instance, if we are referring the sub-national expenditures in secondary education, then the 
number of secondary students in the country will become the number of clients, and the norm 
will be obtained by dividing SENj by this number.  
 
It is clear that this method requires the existence of demographic data for all jurisdictions, as well 
as a functional classification of expenditures that is not always available for sub-national 
governments. In this context, some gains in feasibility can be obtained by simplifying the 
procedure; either considering only the most important sub-national functions, or grouping the 
functions that have the same type of clients. For instance, if the administrative costs cannot be 
assigned to specific functions, and there are also some rather unimportant functions classified as 
―other expenditures,‖ then it will be convenient to add them up and divide the result by the 
population, which in these particular cases would represent a good proxy of the number of 
clients. 
 
Given a certain number of clients, once the funding envelope for any category has been 
determined then, the per client norm has been implicitly defined. Accordingly, the amount of 
money per capita or per client in the norm can be decided in an ad hoc manner by line ministries 
or even stated in the law for several years or changed every year. However, the problem with this 
approach is that either the norms may not be affordable or may be too little; thus, in order to 
ensure the feasibility of the norms, the best practice within this approach is to first subdivide 
from the top (according to the expenditure priorities of the central authorities) the available 
funding envelope for local governments in all the expenditure functions or categories, as 
recommended in the ―first step.‖  
 
Step 3: To compute the per capita equivalent need of all per client functional norms 
(determined in the second step) for all jurisdictions. 
 
This step is necessary because the formula of fiscal disparities is defined at a jurisdictional level 
and expressed in per capita units, and so all the elements to be incorporated must be defined in 
identical terms. The computation consists in multiplying the per client functional norm defined at 
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the national level (SENj / Cj) by the ratio between the number of clients of that function in each 
locality and its population (Cj i / Pi). The reasoning involved is very simple: If, for instance, in 
certain jurisdiction with a population of 9 inhabitants the number of clients of the function j is 3 
(so the clients correspond to one third of the population), then a per client need of, let say L$6 
million, is perfectly equivalent to a per capita need of L$2 million (one third of the per client 
need) within the jurisdiction.  
 
Either in the step 2 or 3, the per capita equivalent need of each category of expenditures can be 
adjusted upwards or downwards in order to reflect differences in the costs of provision across 
jurisdictions. Again, this must be done in such a way that the overall budget affordability of the 
norm is not affected. 
 
Step 4: To compute the per capita expenditure need of each jurisdiction j by adding up its per 
capita equivalent needs for all categories. 
 
If we are considering three functional categories of expenditures (j = 1, 2 or 3), once the SENj 
has been determined as in the first step of the procedure, the three remaining steps can be 
summarized in the following expression:  
 
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
P
C
C
SEN
P
C
C
SEN
P
C
C
SEN
EN
3
3
32
2
21
1
1   
 
Due to several positive features, this methodology constitutes a very attractive alternative for the 
design of an intergovernmental transfer system. Because of its structure, the per client financial 
expenditure norms‘ methodology is able to define feasible national norms that are also flexible 
enough to be adjusted in response to changes in national public policy, to consider differences in 
cost provision across jurisdictions, and also to adapt to limited available information. 
Additionally, the estimation of expenditures needs is explicitly linked with the functions of the 
sub-national governments, which is the correct approach to measuring expenditures needs. 
Finally, its simplicity contributes to the transparency of the system and the predictability of the 
amount of transfers to be received by the local governments. 
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The main drawback of the methodology is its dependence on the selected expenditure norms. A 
careful and rational determination of the national expenditures norms (or the available funding 
envelope for each category) is in this case crucial for the success of the intergovernmental 
transfer system, because deviations from the actual expenditure needs can importantly affect its 
equalizing effects. In this regard, the historical averages of per client expenditures by function 
can provide a natural reference of magnitude, and each expenditure norm can be adjusted 
upwards or downwards with caution, considering both the national priorities and the effects on 
the available funding envelope, such that the remaining functional norms do not result 
underestimated or overestimated.  
 
4.  Weighted indexes of expenditure needs 
This is perhaps the most commonly used approach for estimating expenditure needs.
32
 It roughly 
consists in creating a composite index of expenditure needs, which captures and weights the 
factors determining the cost differences in delivering a standard package of local government 
services across jurisdictions. Such factors include demographic variables reflecting, for example, 
the special needs of the young and the elderly, other factors such as the level of poverty and 
unemployment, and differences in the price level or cost of living. The list of criteria entering the 
index and the weight used need to be carefully assessed and also thoroughly discussed with all 
stakeholders to ensure that the main causes for substantial differences in the costs of public 
service delivery across jurisdictions are captured in the index.  
 
The methodology for computing the weighted index and the per capita expenditure needs is 
conceptually simple, but it requires several steps that are better explained sequentially: 
 
Step 1: To determine the aggregate level of sub-national expenditures needs (SEN.) 
 
Step 2: To select the variables or factors explaining the cost differences in delivering a standard 
package of local government services. 
 
                                                 
32
 This approach is implicitly applied when a weighted-factor mechanism is used for allocating equalization grants. 
In this case, however, we clearly restrict its usage to estimating expenditure needs, while in practice the weighted-
factor formulas are usually not very transparent in separating expenditure needs from fiscal capacity. 
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Step 3: To compute the indexes representing the relative expenditure need of each and every 
jurisdiction, for each and every selected variable:  
 


n
i
k
i
k
i
k
i FFr
1
/ , 
 where k
iF  is the value of the variable k for the jurisdiction i, n the number of 
jurisdictions, and thus k
ir  the index of relative expenditure need of jurisdiction i 
according to the values of the variable k. 
 
Step 4: To establish the weights or the relative importance of the selected factors in the 
determination of expenditure needs, ka , which are identical for all jurisdictions, such 
that: 
 1
1


m
k
ka , where m is the number of factors. 
 
Step 5: To compute the composite index of expenditure needs for all jurisdictions i ( iIEN ): 
 


m
k
k
i
k
i raIEN
1
. 
 
Step 6: To compute the expenditure needs for all jurisdictions i: 
 SENIENEN ii  . 
 
The effectiveness of this methodology in estimating expenditure needs depends critically on the 
choice of the factors and their weights. Objective choices of factors and weights capturing the 
variation in expenditure needs can be made by using simple statistical techniques. The factors are 
those explaining the differences in expenditure needs and the weights represent the relative 
contribution of each factor to the overall measure of need. In practice, however, the data required 
to objectively select the factors and estimate their proper weights is not always available, and 
these decisions, clearly subject to political pressure, are made in an arbitrary and obscure 
manner. 
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Local government officials and parliamentarians have incentives to fight for the inclusion of 
those factors that favor their own constituencies, or for weighting them more heavily, so if the 
analysis is not based on objective information, the political process can easily result in a formula 
that do not estimate expenditures needs properly. There also exist a tendency for policy makers 
to ―over-design‖ the measure of expenditure needs by including too many factors, adding 
complexity and reducing transparency in the allocation scheme. In reality, the inclusion of more 
factors does not necessarily represent a gain in accuracy, because they are usually correlated and 
thus no new information is effectively added. 
 
Therefore, a balance has to be struck between simplicity and transparency, and it is necessary to 
find factors that equitably reflect the true fiscal need of local governments. Variables used as 
factors should more accurately reflect needs, come from an independent source, and be free of 
manipulation by either central government or sub-national governments.  
 
5.  Traditional (bottom-up) physical expenditure norms 
Expenditure needs can also be measured in a bottom-up manner, by exhaustively costing a 
standardized basket of local government services. In addition to the determination of standard 
levels of public services (national averages or minimum requirements), this approach requires a 
detailed quantification of the inputs, information about their cost or prices, a description of the 
production process for all local public goods and services, and very explicit procedures for how 
to cost all aspects of the expenditure responsibilities of sub-national governments. The 
expenditure needs for each local government are obtained by simply adding up all the costs of 
delivering the targeted standards associated with the sub-national services within the jurisdiction. 
 
Although intuitively appealing, the traditional approach is usually unrealistic due to the 
impossibility of gathering all the information it requires. Collecting and managing all the 
information could be very demanding in terms of effort and extremely expensive. Finally, this 
approach may also be impractical because it can lead to unaffordable estimations of expenditure 
needs, forcing to adjust downwards the computed expenditure needs.  
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These important drawbacks explain why the international practice has consistently moved 
toward alternative approaches in expenditure needs‘ estimation during the last decades.33 In 
particular, the ―top-down‖ approach already explained can be regarded as the most adequate and 
suitable whenever the information available at the sub-national level is limited; while other 
statistically based approaches can provide ―ideal‖ estimations of local expenditure needs when 
the data is detailed and abundant enough to do so. One example of the latter approach is the 
Representative Expenditure System, methodology that will be explained in the following point. 
 
6.  Regression-based representative expenditure system (RES) 
Among the methodologies presented here for measuring expenditure needs, this is the most 
sophisticated and conceptually complex one. It is data intensive, and thus not suitable to be 
applied in all countries, but it offers a very good estimation of expenditure needs and so it is 
worth it to be explained briefly. 
 
Step 1: To select, among the expenditures responsibilities of sub-national governments, those 
functions or categories that will be subject to equalization. 
 
Step 2: To identify the main factors, other than the prices of inputs, determining the cost of 
providing local services for each of the selected functions. This can be done through a 
regression analyses in which the explained or dependent variables are the actual 
expenditures incurred in each functions and the explanatory or independent variables 
are those that would explain the differences in the cost of providing public services 
across jurisdictions. The relevant factors will be those that are statistically significant 
and have a relevant impact in the costs of public service provision. 
 
Step 3: To compute the per capita representative expenditures for each function and each 
locality by using the coefficients obtained in step 2. The representative expenditures 
can be interpreted as the amount of money that a local government would have spent in 
some category if it had provided the standard level of service.  
                                                 
33
 Only few countries, most of them developed, have the capacity to deal adequately with highly detailed 
expenditure norms. Examples of countries currently using this ―bottom-up‖ approach are Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Japan. 
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Step 4: To adjust the per capita representative expenditures by considering the input prices.  
 
Step 5: To sum the adjusted per capita representative expenditures of all categories to arrive to 
the total per capita representative expenditures. 
 
The representative revenue system is technically considered as the best approach to estimate 
expenditure needs, so it can be recommended whenever its application is feasible. However, the 
procedure is data intensive and it is usually not possible, or too expensive, to collect the all 
detailed information required for the proper use of this model. 
 
 
Appendix 3. Alternative Approaches to Measuring Fiscal Capacity
34
 
 
Fiscal capacity of a sub-national government may be defined as the potential revenues that can 
be obtained from the tax bases assigned to the sub-national government if an average level of 
effort (by national standards) is applied to those tax bases. Thus, ideally, the measure of fiscal 
capacity should consider either the size of the tax bases available to sub-national governments or 
the revenue that these tax bases would yield under standard tax rates.  
 
A variety of methods are used around the world to measure local government‘s fiscal capacity, 
four of which are going to be presented here. 
 
1.  Lagged own revenue collections 
The lagged or historical level of revenue collections constitutes a very simple way to define the 
fiscal capacity of the jurisdictions. Unfortunately, using past collections does not satisfactorily 
address the problem of negative incentives, because sub-national governments can easily ―learn‖ 
that higher collections translate into lower transfers and consequently reduce their tax effort in 
order to take advantage of the transfer system. 
 
                                                 
34
 See again Gomez et a. (2007) and Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007). 
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Another important problem with this approach is the existence of a difference or gap (sometimes 
large) between actual and potential collections in any jurisdiction, as well as the fact that the size 
of these gaps also vary across jurisdictions. There are several causes for these gaps to arise. One 
cause could be some differences on the tax structure or in the definition of the tax base across 
jurisdictions. For instance, they could compute the taxable income in a different way or have 
dissimilar criteria for tax exemptions. In both cases, the tax collection will likely differ between 
similar jurisdictions, even in the case where their fiscal capacity is identical. Similarly, tax 
avoidance and tax evasion might affect some local governments more than others, and the ability 
to overcome these problems, including the costs that must be assumed in order to improve the 
compliance rates, may also vary across jurisdictions. 
 
In general, using the actual amount of revenue collections in a jurisdiction as a measure of fiscal 
capacity should be avoided if local authorities can control tax rates, tax base, or administrative 
enforcement effort. In such a case, some local governments would be able to reduce the actual 
collections (in exchange, for example, of political benefits) and benefit in an undesirable way 
from the equalization transfer system. This kind of practices could seriously damage the 
equalizing effects of the program.  
 
Due to these complications, and the similar shortcomings presented by the lagged expenditure 
values in estimating expenditure needs, the direct application of historical data in estimating the 
fiscal disparities should in general be avoided. As an alternative, the same as in the case of 
expenditure needs‘ estimation, simple manipulation of the available historical data can serve to 
reduce the problems related with perverse incentives and the differences between actual 
collections and ―true‖ fiscal capacity. The following methodology is an example of this strategy. 
 
2.  Average of past collection ratios 
In order to reduce the problems related with the use of lagged own revenue collections in 
estimating fiscal capacity, some slight manipulations of historical collection can provide 
effective and straightforward solutions. 
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The present methodology roughly consists in computing the ratio between local per capita 
revenues and the per capita revenues at the national level for several years, and then to obtain an 
average of these ratios for each jurisdiction, which indicates the relative size of local per capita 
collections with respect to the national standard in a period of several years. Thus, a single 
estimator of relative fiscal capacity is obtained for each jurisdiction and considering only 
historical collection data. As we will explain, there are important potential advantages in using 
historical data in this rather indirect way. The complete procedure can be summarized in the 
following six steps: 
 
Step 1: To select, among all sources of revenues, those that can be used to represent the fiscal 
capacity of local governments. 
 
If fiscal capacity is understood as the revenues that a local government would rise by applying 
standard tax rates to their tax bases, then it is natural to consider the own taxes applied by the 
local government within its jurisdiction as the most important source of revenues. However, 
since what matters is to measure the ability of local government to cover its expenditure needs, it 
is also necessary to include those received as revenue sharing from the central government and 
all intergovernmental transfers exempting only equalization transfers. Again, in order to avoid 
undesirable manipulation, it is desirable that no discretion is allowed by central or local 
government officials in the determination of the tax rates or the composition of the tax base on 
these sources of revenue. 
 
Step 2: To define the historical periods that can serve better as a reference for estimating future 
fiscal capacity. 
 
The more the periods considered, the lower the possibility of undesirable manipulation of the 
index created for estimating future fiscal capacity. However, the use of very old collection data 
can be misleading if many changes have taken place in the collection patterns of local 
governments during the last years. For these reasons, periods of three, four or five years, 
depending on data availability and current relevancy of the information, could be a plausible 
choice. 
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Step 3: To compute the per capita revenue for each jurisdiction i and for each period t (Rjt), as 
well as the per capita revenue at a national level for every year (RNt).  
 
Defining Pit and PNt as the population in jurisdiction i and the national population in period t, 
respectively, then the per capita revenues for each revenue source j, jurisdiction i and period t are 
defined as 
ti
t
tji
P
jsourcefromiforrevenues
R
,
     , and    
tN
t
tjN
P
jsourcerevenuestotal
R
,
 . 
Furthermore, the total per capita revenues at jurisdictional and national level in each period are 
given by  j tjiti RR  and  j tjNtN RR , respectively. 
 
Step 4:  To compute the relative collection ratios, for every jurisdiction i and period t (RCRit), 
which are obtained for every year by dividing the per capita revenues of jurisdiction i 
by the national per capita revenues: 
tNtiit RRRCR  . 
 
The relative collection ratios can be lower, equal or higher than one, meaning that the 
jurisdiction have collected less, the same or more per capita revenues than the country as a whole 
during a certain year. 
 
Step 5:  To compute the index of relative collection for each jurisdiction (IRCi), as the average 
of all relative collection ratios of the jurisdiction. Defining T as the number of periods 
selected for the estimation, then TRCRIRC
t tii  . 
 
The index of relative collection has exactly the same interpretation than the relative collection 
ratios, but it refers to a longer period of time. This last characteristic helps to moderate the 
perverse incentives associated with the benefits of reducing tax collections, because now, if a 
local government wants to increase the amount of future transfers, it must modify a multi-year 
average instead of a single-year result. Indeed, the expected benefits of reducing the local tax 
collections are decreased in proportion to the number of periods used in the computation of the 
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average, and so the perverse incentives are directly reduced as well. Additionally, if the local 
government officials are not sure whether they will remain in their positions during the following 
years or not, then the idea of beneficiating competing political parties in the future can also 
discourage that behavior. If present, this ―democratic factor‖ could eventually increase the 
effectiveness of this methodology. 
 
Step 6:  To estimate the per capita fiscal capacity for all jurisdictions as: 
 ii IRCFC  aggregate revenue forecast 
 
This estimation of fiscal capacity can be interpreted as the fiscal capacity that the local 
government i would have in the forecasted period if the average tax collection at the local and 
national level remain unchanged and the macroeconomic expectations are fulfilled.  
 
3.  Basic proxies for the local ability to tax 
A different approach to estimating the fiscal capacity of sub-national governments is by 
considering proxies, or variables that in theory should be highly correlated with their ability to 
collect revenues. A widely used variable is the per capita level of personal income, which tends 
to be a good proxy and is usually available. Another commonly used variable is the gross 
regional product (GRP), which is the sub-national equivalent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
and can also serve as a proxy of fiscal capacity. GRP is actually a more comprehensive measure 
of fiscal capacity than per capita income because it includes all the income generated within a 
region, personal and corporate, irrespective of the location of residence of the worker or 
producer. 
 
In order to improve the estimation of fiscal capacity, it is also possible to exclude from the GRP 
certain items such as central taxes and transfers, which are not part of the potential tax base. The 
resulting modified version of the GRP is referred as Total Taxable Resources (TTR), and it 
constitutes a very good estimator of fiscal capacity. 
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4.  Representative Revenue System (RRS) 
The basic idea underlying the RRS is to calculate the amount of revenue that a region would 
collect if it were to exert average fiscal effort. This is done by collecting data on revenue 
collections and tax bases for each tax under consideration and for every sub-national region. 
Based upon information on all tax bases for every region as well as the national average fiscal 
effort for each of the taxes, one can compute the amount of revenues that each jurisdiction would 
collect under average fiscal effort. This amount is then considered to quantify the fiscal capacity 
of each jurisdiction.  
 
The RRS is a thorough and complete method to accurately measure the fiscal capacity of a 
region. It is based on disaggregated data and a detailed knowledge of (proxies for) the statutory 
tax bases, taking into account variations in effective tax rates among various tax components and 
non-tax revenue sources. As a result, fiscal capacity as measured by the RRS can be considered 
as an accurate representation of a region‘s true fiscal capacity. However, due to the 
disaggregated nature of the information, the measure is data-intensive and is not always possible 
to use it. 
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Appendix 4. Computation of per capita FEEP transfers by adjusted weighted index formula in the IRA for provinces 
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) 
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)/
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) 
(12)
b
 (13)
c
 (14)
d
 
Region I Ilocos Norte 547284 3504.3 54789 39055 11923 1178.15  0.0080  0.0108  0.0065  0.0129  0.0032  0.0127  0.0093  261.41  
Region I Ilocos Sur 633138 2595.96 65759 45106 17238 989.65  0.0092  0.0080  0.0078  0.0149  0.0046  0.0130  0.0100  242.71  
Region I La Union 720972 1503.75 75822 42327 35618 818.88  0.0105  0.0046  0.0090  0.0140  0.0094  0.0132  0.0107  227.66  
Region I Pangasinan 2.65E+06 5451.01 307465 138257 114400 632.97  0.0386  0.0167  0.0364  0.0456  0.0303  0.0134  0.0298  172.97  
…                
CAR Abra 230953 4198.2 26739 15529 15182 2438.18  0.0034  0.0129  0.0032  0.0051  0.0040  0.0111  0.0065  431.31  
CAR Apayao 103633 4351.23 12865 4663 8463 3853.51  0.0015  0.0134  0.0015  0.0015  0.0022  0.0093  0.0047  700.67  
CAR Benguet 372533 2769.08 41508 14639 5992 1909.24  0.0054  0.0085  0.0049  0.0048  0.0016  0.0118  0.0068  282.04  
CAR Ifugao 180815 2628.21 21008 8012 7716 2195.43  0.0026  0.0081  0.0025  0.0026  0.0020  0.0114  0.0053  451.08  
CAR Kalinga 182326 3231.25 22948 8092 7314 2066.59  0.0027  0.0099  0.0027  0.0027  0.0019  0.0116  0.0056  468.36  
CAR Mt. Province 148661 2157.38 18489 9467 10280 2325.84  0.0022  0.0066  0.0022  0.0031  0.0027  0.0113  0.0050  521.29  
Source: Own calculation.  
a: Fiscal capacity is computed by the average of past collection ratios method (FC1).  
b: (12)=[max(12)-(12)]/{N*[max(12)-average(12)]}, where N is the number of provinces.  
b:(13)=0.35*(7)+0.1*(8) +0.1*(9)+ 0.1*(10) +0.1*(11) +0.25*(12).   
c: (14)=[(13)*total available FEEP for provinces]/(1). 
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Appendix 5. Computation of per capita expenditure needs by expenditure norms (EN1) for provinces 
  Number of clients Equivalent per capita need   
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EN1 
Aggregate expenditure (Million) 20953.9  2315.6  9033.9  30.2  827.7  973  9900.8  1594.4  10519.2  
(7
)+
+
…
+
(1
5 )
 
Aggregate clients (Thousands) 686071  575242.4  206819.9  360508.3  37812.1  30308.2  686071  686071  686071  
Expenditure norm       305.4  40.3  436.8  0.8  218.9  321.0  144.3  23.2  153.3  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)…(15)=expenditure norm * number of clients/total population 
Region I Ilocos Norte 547284 452289 165533  310260 11923 39055 305.42  33.27  132.12  0.47  4.77  22.91  144.31  23.24  153.32  819.83  
Region I Ilocos Sur 633138 520984 192889  350452 17238 45106 305.42  33.12  133.07  0.46  5.96  22.87  144.31  23.24  153.32  821.78  
Region I La Union 720972 601508 214821  400487 35618 42327 305.42  33.58  130.15  0.46  10.81  18.85  144.31  23.24  153.32  820.15  
Region I Pangasinan 2.60E+06 2196819 795941  1395381 114400 138257 305.42  33.43  131.42  0.44  9.47  16.78  144.31  23.24  153.32  817.83  
…                  
CAR Abra 230953 188026 71420  121812 15182 15529 305.42  32.77  135.08  0.44  14.39  21.59  144.31  23.24  153.32  830.56  
CAR Apayao 103633 86037 31230  54473 8463 4663 305.42  33.42  131.63  0.44  17.88  14.44  144.31  23.24  153.32  824.10  
CAR Benguet 372533 314799 107877  206660 5992 14639 305.42  34.02  126.49  0.46  3.52  12.62  144.31  23.24  153.32  803.40  
CAR Ifugao 180815 151577 53531  94155 7716 8012 305.42  33.74  129.32  0.44  9.34  14.22  144.31  23.24  153.32  813.36  
CAR Kalinga 182326 151058 55044  92441 7314 8092 305.42  33.35  131.87  0.42  8.78  14.25  144.31  23.24  153.32  814.96  
CAR Mt. Province 148661 120283 46421  73366 10280 9467 305.42  32.57  136.40  0.41  15.14  20.44  144.31  23.24  153.32  831.25  
Source: Own calculation.  
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Appendix 6: Computation of per capita expenditure needs by weighted index formula (EN2) for provinces 
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Region I Ilocos Norte 547284 3504.3 54789 39055 11923 0.0080  0.0108  0.0065  0.0129  0.0032  0.0082  839.77  
Region I Ilocos Sur 633138 2595.96 65759 45106 17238 0.0092  0.0080  0.0078  0.0149  0.0046  0.0090  795.71  
Region I La Union 720972 1503.75 75822 42327 35618 0.0105  0.0046  0.0090  0.0140  0.0094  0.0098  759.45  
Region I Pangasinan 2.60E+06 5451.01 307465 138257 114400 0.0386  0.0167  0.0364  0.0456  0.0303  0.0348  738.21  
…              
CAR Abra 230953 4198.2 26739 15529 15182 0.0034  0.0129  0.0032  0.0051  0.0040  0.0051  1246.52  
CAR Apayao 103633 4351.23 12865 4663 8463 0.0015  0.0134  0.0015  0.0015  0.0022  0.0034  1844.61  
CAR Benguet 372533 2769.08 41508 14639 5992 0.0054  0.0085  0.0049  0.0048  0.0016  0.0051  775.90  
CAR Ifugao 180815 2628.21 21008 8012 7716 0.0026  0.0081  0.0025  0.0026  0.0020  0.0033  1037.59  
CAR Kalinga 182326 3231.25 22948 8092 7314 0.0027  0.0099  0.0027  0.0027  0.0019  0.0037  1124.21  
CAR Mt. Province 148661 2157.38 18489 9467 10280 0.0022  0.0066  0.0022  0.0031  0.0027  0.0031  1157.96  
Source: Own calculation.  
a: (11)=0.4*(6)+0.15*(7) +0.15*(8)+ 0.15*(9) +0.15*(10) .   
b: (12)=[(11)*Aggregate expenditure needs for provinces]/(1). 
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Appendix 7: Computation of per capita fiscal capacity according to the average of past collection ratios (FC1) for provinces 
  Own revenues 
Total 
populat
ion 
Relative fiscal capacity 
(three years average) Estimated own revenues 
Other 
revenues
a
 FC1 Region Province 2006 2007 2008 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(5)= 
[(1)/sum(1)+(2)/sum(2)+(3)/sum(3)
]/3 
(6)=(5)* Aggregate forecast of total        
collection 
(7) [(6)+(7)]/(4) 
Region I Ilocos Norte 77356752 108695952 92351480 547284 0.0107 1.05E+08 539783808 1178.15 
Region I Ilocos Sur 20831182 41236792 53646624 633138 0.0043 42399980 584188032 989.65 
Region I La Union 61574848 61154420 70983048 720972 0.0074 73129216 517261952 818.88 
Region I Pangasinan 196064336 277683264 227151808 2645395 0.0269 2.65E+08 1409807616 632.97 
…          
CAR Abra 23107566 27399410 26263748 230953 0.0030 29004076 534100864 2438.18 
CAR Apayao 2268535.5 2356469.25 5290131.5 103633 0.0004 3625051 395726048 3853.51 
CAR Benguet 147329360 171195008 205977840 372533 0.0200 1.96E+08 514814784 1909.24 
CAR Ifugao 16102927 46683580 87096672 180815 0.0055 53592896 343372960 2195.43 
CAR Kalinga 15263204 17097756 17325910 182326 0.0019 18771798 358020480 2066.59 
CAR 
Mt. 
Province 23072496 26786104 31963782 148661 0.0031 30656818 315104256 2325.84 
a: other revenues include share from national tax collection, extraordinary receipts aids, loans and borrowings, and inter-local transfers in the fiscal year of 2008. 
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Appendix 8: Computation of relative fiscal gap for provinces (taking fiscal capacity measure 1 as an example) 
Region Province 
Per capita expenditure needs by 
Expenditure norms (EN1) 
Per capita fiscal capacity by 
the average of past collection  
ratios (FC1) 
Fiscal gap measure 1 Relative fiscal gap measure1 
  (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4)=(3)/sum(3) 
Region I Ilocos Norte 819.83  1178.15  -358.33  0.01112  
Region I Ilocos Sur 821.78  989.65  -167.87  0.00521  
Region I La Union 820.15  818.88  1.27  -0.00004  
Region I Pangasinan 817.83  632.97  184.86  -0.00574  
…      
CAR Abra 830.56  2438.18  -1607.62  0.04989  
CAR Apayao 824.10  3853.51  -3029.41  0.09401  
CAR Benguet 803.40  1909.24  -1105.85  0.03432  
CAR Ifugao 813.36  2195.43  -1382.07  0.04289  
CAR Kalinga 814.96  2066.59  -1251.62  0.03884  
CAR Mt. Province 831.25  2325.84  -1494.58  0.04638  
Source: Own calculation 
 
 
